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Race-Conscious Jury Selection
ANNA OFFIT
Among the central issues in scholarship on the American jury is the
effect of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) on discriminatory empanelment.
Empirical legal research has confirmed that despite the promise of the
Batson doctrine, both peremptory strikes and challenges for cause
remain tools of racial exclusion. But these studies, based on post facto
interviews, transcript analysis, and quantitative methods offer little
insight into Batson’s critical impact on real-time decision-making and
strategy in voir dire. If we increasingly know what kinds of juries are
produced in the post-Batson world, we know very little about how they
are produced.
This Article addresses this problem with data derived from a five-year
field study of Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Through interviews and
participant observation during jury selection proceedings, it provides
an unprecedented empirical perspective on how Batson has made race
central to the ways prosecutors perceive, pick, and strike jurors. Rather
than diminishing race’s influence on voir dire, Batson has made it an
essential consideration for prosecutors concerned with their in-court
performance and professional reputations.
This race-conscious approach to jury selection has arisen in part due
to a clear doctrinal shift in courts’ analyses of juror questioning and
striking. This shift has expanded the scope of judicial inquiry during the
adjudication of Batson challenges from scrutiny of individual “neutral”
rationales for juror dismissals to a more robust comparative juror
analysis. My empirical findings indicate that there is a meaningful
connection between this latter approach and the incorporation of
antidiscrimination norms into prosecutorial approaches to voir dire.
Having identified and described this link, it becomes possible to
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perform a deeper audit of the Batson framework, and suggest, as this
Article does, that with reform and expansion to address welldocumented limitations, it may serve to narrow the gap between juries
as they are and juries as the Constitution would have them be.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the U.S. criminal justice system, laypeople are the first to be judged.1
These are the citizens summoned for jury service and subject to a preliminary
period of questioning referred to as voir dire.2 After learning about these
people’s professional and personal backgrounds, judges and lawyers can
dismiss them from the jury pool through challenges “for cause” or peremptory
strikes.3 Examining both kinds of challenges, empirical legal scholars have
1 See GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT’L

CTRS. FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF
JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 13 (Apr. 2007).
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986) (“Prior to voir dire examination,
which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges, lawyers wish to know as much as
possible about prospective jurors, including their age, education, employment, and economic
status, so that they can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial period of
time, counsel also may seek to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other
cases and the outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investigators
to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We have had no occasion to
consider particularly this practice. Of course, counsel’s effort to obtain possibly relevant
information about prospective jurors is to be distinguished from the practice at issue here.”)
(citation omitted).
3 Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory S. Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury
Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1411–12 (2018).
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documented significant opportunities for abuse, as lawyers may exercise their
discretion to prejudicially empanel non-representative juries.4
Trial attorneys and judges eager to identify and remedy the exclusionary use
of peremptory challenges, in particular, have relied on the approach articulated
by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits the dismissal of
jurors based on membership in a protected class.5 This antidiscrimination
framework strives toward “race-neutral” jury selection6 by addressing racial
animus, characterized by the use of peremptory strikes to disproportionately
empanel White jurors.7 In an innovative move, Batson permitted judges to
scrutinize prosecutors’ rationales for striking jurors in the context of a single
trial.8 It also furnished lawyers with a new tool—the Batson challenge—that
could be directed toward an adversary who used strikes to exclude jurors based
on race.9
Critics of the Batson framework rightly highlight its limited capacity to
identify and deter prosecutors who are “of a mind to discriminate . . . .”10 When
asked to account for a peremptory strike decision after a Batson challenge, a
prosecutor could very well choose to conceal prejudicial motives by offering
pretextual or post-hoc rationales for her decision.11 Without the means to
4 See, e.g., id. at 1411.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97 (noting that while the State must respond to a

challenge of impermissible discrimination with a “neutral explanation for challenging black
jurors” this rationale does not have to rise to the level of justifying a cause challenge).
7 See Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso & Abijah P. Taylor, Examining Jurors:
Applying Conversation Analysis to Voir Dire in Capital Cases, a First Look, 107 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 687, 689–91 (2017) (noting that “[t]he Batson regime suffers from a major
design flaw as it was intended to counter intentional discrimination”).
8 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
9 Batson articulated a three-step test for adjudicating suspected race-based exclusion.
First, following defense counsel’s Batson challenge, a trial court judge would determine
whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been made, by proving the juror belonged
to a protected class and determining whether all “relevant circumstances” of the strike raised
an inference of impermissible discrimination. Id. at 96–97. Subject to this finding, the burden
would shift to the State to provide a “neutral explanation” for challenging Black prospective
jurors. Id. at 97. The trial court ended the inquiry by determining whether the defendant had
established purposeful discrimination, thus supporting a Batson violation. Id. at 98.
10 See Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race,
Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 72
(2009); infra Part IV.A.
11 Prosecutors’ practice of referencing a lengthy list of rationales for a peremptory
challenge has been referred to as taking a “laundry list” approach, which some courts
explicitly treat with disfavor. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 417 P.3d 662, 681 (Cal. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2774 (2019) (noting that this technique “carries a significant danger: that
the trial court will take a short-cut in its determination of the prosecutor’s credibility, picking
one plausible item from the list and summarily accepting it without considering whether the
prosecutor’s explanation as a whole, including offered reasons that are implausible or
unsupported by the prospective juror’s questionnaire and voir dire, indicates a pretextual
justification”) (citing Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (2016)).
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definitively test the veracity of their strike rationales, Batson’s “race neutral”
aspiration, by these accounts, is impracticable.12
In the decades since Batson, courts have continued to formally eschew the
explicit reference to race in evaluations of prospective jurors.13 Notwithstanding
the opinion’s rhetoric of neutrality, the adjudication of Batson violations relies
heavily on documentation of prospective jurors’ racial (or gender) identities,
which are used to determine whether lawyers’ questioning styles and strike
decisions are prejudicial.14 This documentation is perceived to be particularly
useful when judges are confronted with prospective jurors of different races and
genders who nevertheless express similar views. Here, judges can use this
record to determine whether lawyers have subjected all such jurors to the same
kind of scrutiny and questioning.15 If, ceteris paribus, race appears to correlate
with the disproportionate exclusion or empanelment of certain groups, lawyers
risk the confirmation of a violation, opening a pathway for appeal.16
There is nonetheless empirical evidence suggesting that despite its
limitations, Batson is in fact changing lawyers’ jury selection strategies.17 A
qualitative case study from the Midwest, for example, revealed that while most
attorneys rely on race, gender, and class stereotypes during jury selection,
Batson has led to increased awareness of the importance of seeking an inclusive
jury.18 In this context, as in the case study examined in the current Article,
reforming voir dire to achieve race-neutral jury selection has kept race at the
forefront of lawyers’ thinking.19 What remains to be seen is whether a more
conscientious approach to peremptory challenges can serve as a corrective to
the significant racial disparities produced through the exercise of cause
challenges, which reinforce inequality legally, and in plain sight.20
12 See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010); Antony Page, Batson’s
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155,
160–61 (2005).
13 This includes contexts in which a defendant’s exercise of a peremptory challenge
was aimed at enhancing the representativeness of her jury. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) (“Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can
be no doubt that the harm is the same—in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public
racial discrimination.”). Justice O’Connor also argued that peremptory challenges (based on
gender, rather than race) be exercised against the government only. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part II. B.
16 Infra Part II. B.
17 See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers
Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 363 (2005).
18 See id. at 369–70.
19 See id. at 389.
20 See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 790–91 (2020) (arguing that most racial exclusion
in the jury selection process occurred through the exercise of cause challenges).
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The limited data on Batson’s impact on prosecutorial decision-making and
strategy in part reflects methodology. Empirical research on Batson has
typically used qualitative interviews,21 transcript analysis,22 and quantitative
analyses of federal and state court documents23 to describe prosecutors’ strike
patterns and the demographics of empaneled juries. These have contributed
invaluable insight into the kinds of juries that are common post-Batson. But
lacking data on in-court behavior and discourse, the burgeoning scholarship in
this area has largely overlooked the effects of Batson’s antidiscrimination
doctrine on “the quotidian reality of voir dire practice.”24 Most critically, while
we know that Batson affects prosecutors’ decision-making,25 we have little data
on how prosecutors integrate antidiscrimination norms into their jury selection
strategies in real time.26 This is a significant object of legal study; understanding
how the Batson framework works—or does not work—with respect to race
opens the door to not only improving the doctrine but extending it to address
other forms of discrimination.
That is the focus of this Article, which draws on an original, five-year field
study to examine Batson’s impact on prosecutorial decision-making. The study
consisted of participant observation in twenty-six jury selection proceedings and
semi-structured interviews with 133 Assistant U.S. Attorneys.27 A central
finding that emerges from this data is that prosecutors’ selection criteria,
questioning, and dismissal of jurors reflect acute self-consciousness.28 This is a
self-consciousness that stems from concern about the possibility that their
peremptory strike decisions will raise inferences of purposeful racial
discrimination that they will be unprepared to rebut or dispel.29 Prosecutors’
concern not to be perceived as biased motivated many of them to exercise
21 See Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 17, at 363.
22 See O’Brien et al., supra note 7, at 691–92.
23 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About

Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–49 (1996); Wright
et al., supra note 3, at 1407.
24 Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 17, at 369.
25 See id.
26 See, e.g., Shaun L. Gabbidon, Leslie K. Kowal, Kareem L. Jordan, Jennifer L.
Roberts & Nancy Vincenzi, Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Analysis of
Litigation from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2002–2006, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 59, 67 (2008).
Future research should include first-hand observations of the jury selection process.
Such observations can further inform the dynamics of jury selection. Future research
might also include interviews of judges and attorneys regarding their sense of the use
and/or abuse of peremptory challenges. Insider perspectives such as these are likely to
also yield important insights.

Id.
27 Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071, 1084

(2019).
28 See infra Part III.B.
29 See infra Part III.B.

206

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:2

peremptory challenges with an eye toward maintaining others’ perceptions of
their integrity.30
Part II offers critical context that shows how the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on effectuating “race-neutral” jury selection inevitably necessitated the
heightening of race-consciousness to enable meaningful scrutiny of lawyers’
voir dire practices. Parts II.A. and II.B. examine the two most common modes
of assessing prosecutors’ motivations for striking jurors on appeal: comparative
voir dire analysis and comparative strike analysis. The former considers whether
a lawyer engages in the substantive and uniform questioning of all prospective
jurors in the course of jury selection proceedings.31 Comparative strike analysis
revisits prosecutors’ contemporaneous or post-hoc rationales for peremptorily
striking jurors to determine whether their reasoning is disparately invoked or
functions as pretexts for illegal discrimination.32 This section shows that given
the law and practice of Batson, lawyers seeking to prepare for or rebut potential
challenges are functionally compelled to consider and document a juror’s race
and gender, among other attributes. It argues that the now common approach to
assessing lawyers’ motivations through comparative evaluations of questioning
patterns and strike decisions has, as a practical matter, required the doctrine to
dispense with the rhetoric of “neutrality” characteristic of early formulations of
the Batson framework.
Part III offers an original empirical examination of Batson’s impact on
prosecutors’ attitudes toward the jury selection process and assessments of
prospective jurors. Part III.B.1 demonstrates the salience of race in prosecutors’
preparation for and strategy during voir dire. III.B.2 provides evidence of the
antidiscrimination law’s deterrent impact on prosecutors concerned with the
reputational harm and social stigma associated with an adjudicated Batson
violation. Further, it describes the mechanisms that account for Batson’s
continuing limitations.
Part IV considers current reform efforts. Drawing on the empirical and
doctrinal discussions of the previous sections, Part IV.A. reviews dominant
critiques of the Batson doctrine that focus on its underuse, underenforcement,
and inadequate remedies in overt cases of racial exclusion on the part of
prosecutors. Part IV.B. then proposes directions for future reform of the jury
selection process. The Article concludes that studies of prosecutorial decisionmaking during voir dire are key to meaningfully assessing both the limitations
and potential of antidiscrimination laws seeking to alter the discretionary
decisions of legal actors.

30 See infra Part III.B.1.
31 See infra Part II.B.
32 See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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II. THE LAW OF RACE-CONSCIOUS JURY SELECTION
In principle, an American citizen has the right to serve on a jury regardless
of race, national origin, or gender.33 In practice, demographic characteristics
have, for decades, been used by lawyers to shape juries to their advantage.34
Most legal scholars and commentators agree that this violates the normative
aspiration and constitutional protections afforded to the laypeople who
participate in the legal system as an entailment of citizenship.35 In that vein,
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Batson, declared that “public respect
for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we
ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.”36
More recently, Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority in Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019), that apart from voting, “serving on a jury
is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the
democratic process.”37 In the wake of “decades of all-white juries convicting
black defendants,” he stated, the unbiased assessment of prospective jurors is
key to assuring the “confidence of the community and the fairness of the
criminal justice system . . . .”38
Efforts to empanel inclusive juries, however, face several practical hurdles.
First, there is the problem of ensuring that the individuals summoned to court
for jury service—and those who respond to their summonses—reflect the
demographic diversity of their communities.39 Underinclusive jury lists, such as
33 See PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS princ. 2.B (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016)

(“Eligibility for jury service should not be denied or limited on the basis of race, national
origin, gender, age, religious belief, income, occupation, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or any other factor that discriminates against
a cognizable group in the jurisdiction . . . .”).
34 See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1627
(2018).
35 See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL
OF DEMOCRACY (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994).
36 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98–99 (1986) (noting that despite the “important
position” of peremptory challenges, they can be “used to discriminate against black jurors”).
37 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
38 Transcript of Oral Argument on Behalf of the Respondent at 54, Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (No. 17-9572).
39 Legal scholars and empirical researchers have noted the extent to which Black,
Native American and Latinx prospective jurors are more likely to have unstable employment,
greater residential mobility, and greater financial hardship—all of which can affect one’s
ability to report to court in response to a jury summons. See Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T.
Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual Consequences, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversityinclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences
[https://perma.cc/Y8WB-ANKK] (citing Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice
System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 623, 651 (2012) (“African-Americans, Native-Americans and Latinos are more
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those generated from lists of registered voters, as well as material barriers to
participation, can lead to significant attrition before jury selection is
underway.40
Second, there is the issue of excusal. In general, judges have discretion to
dismiss prospective jurors “for cause” based on concerns about jurors’ fairness
and impartiality that are put on the record.41 In addition, jurors are often excused
due to various hardships posed by jury service, including lost income and
caretaking responsibilities.42
Finally, during the last phase of the jury selection process, lawyers can use
an allotted number of peremptory challenges to dismiss jurors for reasons they
do not disclose and need not justify.43 The lack of transparency and absence of
a disclosure requirement related to peremptory challenges has made lawyers’
discretion to exercise them a subject of intense scrutiny, since these challenges
can be used to target and exclude protected groups on prohibited grounds.44 The
need for clear legal guidance and enforcement is obvious: Though lawyers need
not provide justifications, every strike decision has an explicit or implicit one,
and some—based on race or gender for example—are illegal.45
In its 1986 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court established a now famous—
albeit controversial—framework for identifying and remediating race-based
jury exclusion.46 First, the defendant needed to prove that she was a member of
a recognized racial group, and that the government used a peremptory challenge
to excuse a potential juror on account of this shared identity.47 If a trial court
judge determined that such an allegation rose to the level of a “prima facie” case
of discrimination, she could then ask the offending party to state the reasons for
challenging the juror in question.48 In the event that the judge was not satisfied
that an explanation offered was sincere, or worried it was a pretext for race-

likely to be economically disadvantaged, have unstable employment, experience more
family disruptions, and have more residential mobility.”)).
40 See Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, Selected to Serve:
An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 35 (2012)
(noting in their study that jury participation is contingent on receiving and responding to the
receipt of a jury duty summons).
41 See, 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 193 (2020).
42 See HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE
JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64–65 (1993) (noting
that factors that are likely to lead to prospective jurors’ excusal include: “(1) economic
hardship; (2) lack of child care; (3) age; (4) the distance traveled and transportation; and (5)
illness”).
43 In federal felony trials, federal prosecutors can excuse six prospective jurors using
peremptory challenges, and defense counsel, ten. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
44 See Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1413.
45 Id. at 1412.
46 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).
47 Id. at 96.
48 See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012).
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based exclusion, the peremptory challenge could be denied and the juror
reseated if still available to serve.49
Batson gave judges discretion to assess prosecutors’ motivations based on
“relevant circumstances.”50 Assessment was meant, above all, to determine
whether prosecutors had been “neutral” with respect to race during voir dire.51
In practice, determining neutrality as part of adjudicating a potential Batson
violation would involve imputing rationales to lawyers based on limited
evidence.52
Left unresolved was the question of whether lawyers could—or should—
explicitly consider race as grounds for empaneling jurors. Could attorneys bring
racial identifications of prospective jurors to peremptory strike decisions in
service of antidiscrimination law and norms of inclusivity? And should
prosecutors and defense attorneys be in the business of classifying prospective
jurors on the basis of their perceived race?
Subsequent cases have implicitly resolved these questions in the
affirmative. Federal and state cases following Batson demonstrated that
bringing consideration of race to assessments of jurors was not only a functional
necessity but the only practical means of raising an effective Batson challenge
in the first place.53 To understand why, one must look at comparative strike
analysis, the prevailing approach to assessing the propriety of peremptory
challenges under Batson.54

49 Id.
50 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
51 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-

Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1824–25 (1993) (noting
the adverse effects of Batson’s colorblind test).
52 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (noting that the prosecutor must counter a defendant’s
successful prima facie case of discrimination with a “neutral explanation related to the
particular case to be tried”); see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Leslie Ellis & Elisabeth
Schmidt, Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 77, 77 (1997) (noting the extent to which juries are an institution constituted by
“citizens who view themselves and who should be viewed by others as color-blind and
gender-neutral”).
53 Compare Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process
seems better organized and more systematized than ever before.”), with People v. Winbush,
387 P.3d 1187, 1219–23 (Cal. 2017) (adopting the race-conscious comparative juror analysis
of Miller-El but nonetheless holding that the prosecution satisfied all Batson criteria).
54 See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 207 (Cal. 2017) (Liu, J., concurring)
(stating that in conducting a “searching review of the record,” courts must “assess the
credibility
of
reasons
given
for
a
strike
by
drawing
inferences
from . . . ‘circumstantial . . . evidence of intent’ . . . including comparative juror analysis”)
(quoting Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (2016)).
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A. Comparative Strike Analysis
Comparative juror analysis consists of two main lines of evaluating
circumstantial evidence during voir dire.55 The first involves looking at
evidence of differential striking, exemplified in instances where a “lawyer’s
explanation for a strike is equally applicable to jurors of a different race who
have not been stricken . . . .”56 The second line focuses on “meaningful voir
dire” with respect to a particular prospective juror—such as voir dire that
focuses on a juror’s willingness to fairly assess evidence.57
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El
II), 545 U.S. 231 (2005), was among the first to highlight the problem of
disparate striking—that is, the disproportionate striking of jurors who otherwise
shared relevant characteristics with empaneled jurors.58 Justice Souter argued in
his majority opinion that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black
panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack [prospective juror]
who is permitted to serve,” that was evidence “tending to prove purposeful
discrimination.”59 The Court went on to examine the circumstances of Black
prospective jurors’ dismissals in detail.60 In one such case the Court noted
prosecutors’ vehement objection to a Black prospective juror’s recognition that
a capital defendant could be rehabilitated and thus refrain from committing
future crimes, despite taking no action to strike White prospective jurors who
expressed similar views.61 Likewise, the Court highlighted the prosecutors’
decision to dismiss a juror on the basis of his feelings about the death penalty
while failing to object to White prospective jurors who felt similarly.62 Taken
together, the prosecutors’ excusal and empanelment of Black and White jurors
with “similar views” were cited as compelling evidence of racial discrimination,

55 See David Hittner, David J. Beck & Eric J.R. Nichols, Showing of Pretext, in 4
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 36:78 (Robert L. Haig ed.,
4th ed. 2020).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241.
59 Id. This is not to suggest that potential jurors subject to comparative analysis needed
to be “identical in every respect” to prompt an inference of pretext. See, e.g., People v.
Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 56 (“A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim
unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential
jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.”) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El
II), 545 U.S. 231, 247 n.6 (2005)). But see United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1004
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prosecutor’s failure to strike similarly situated jurors is not
pretextual “where there are relevant differences between the struck jurors and the comparator
jurors”).
60 Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241–52.
61 Id. at 244.
62 Id. at 248.
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helping to legitimate comparative strike analysis as a technique for uncovering
illegal exclusion.63
In May 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of
comparative strike analysis.64 The case involved a Black defendant who was
indicted and tried for murdering an elderly White woman in Georgia.65 During
jury selection, the lead prosecutor, District Attorney Stephen Lanier, and his
partner, Assistant District Attorney Douglas Pullen, used peremptory challenges
to strike all four of the Black prospective jurors in the venire.66 The judge
rejected defense counsel’s objections to these challenges under Batson after the
prosecutors offered reasons for the strikes that did not explicitly mention race.67
Foster was sentenced to death.68 The defense attorneys then renewed Foster’s
Batson claim, which was dismissed after an evidentiary hearing.69
The matter might have been settled there when something unusual
happened. After seeking a writ of habeas corpus, Foster gained access to Lanier
and Pullen’s case file under the Georgia Open Records Act.70 The contents of
the file, which were enumerated in the Supreme Court’s opinion, formed the
basis of a damning critique of Lanier who was named forty-six times in a
thirteen-page majority opinion that blasted his approach to jury selection.71 The
Court held that Lanier’s purportedly “race-neutral” rationales for using
peremptory strikes to remove the four Black prospective jurors in the venire
were inconsistent, contradictory, and misrepresented the trial record.72
Rather than focus on the all-White jury that resulted from Lanier and
Pullen’s peremptory strikes, the opinion engaged in the imaginative exercise of
re-narrating the trial team’s decision-making process during the 1987
prosecution.73 Drawing on contemporaneous notes from the trial team’s case
file, the Court assembled evidence of Lanier’s intention to strike Black jurors
despite his claims to the contrary.74 In so doing, the Court reinforced the value—
if not necessity—of generating enough demographic data about prospective
jurors to assess disparities in strike decisions.75
The Court sent an unambiguous message to prosecutors and defense
attorneys in the process: Label and keep track of jurors’ racial identities, genders

63 Id. at 252.
64 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748–54 (2016).
65 See id. at 1742–43.
66 Id.
67 See Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. 1988), rev’d denial of habeas corpus

sub nom. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
68 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1743–44, 1747.
71 See generally id.
72 Id. at 1749–54.
73 See id. at 1748–54.
74 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. at 1754–55.
75 See id.
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and religious beliefs.76 Classify jurors, in other words, on the basis of the very
characteristics that might be used to exclude them.77 Identifying a juror’s race
was understood to be a fundamental prerequisite to proving racism.78 The
opinion thus set the stage for the rise of a new, race-conscious approach to
evaluating lawyers’ assessments of jurors.
This approach emerged in full force in the Court’s analysis of Lanier and
Pullen’s rationales for dismissing a prospective juror named Marilyn Garrett.79
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts first reproduced the “laundry list” of
reasons Lanier offered for striking Garrett.80 He then noted that although these
rationales seemed reasonable “[o]n their face,” they were based on
“misrepresentations.”81 One lie the Court highlighted was Lanier’s suggestion
that he identified Garrett as a “questionable” juror on the day she was excused,
and only dismissed her after comparing her to a juror with the last name
Blackmon—adding, in brackets, that Blackmon was White.82 Citing notes in
Lanier’s case file, the Court rejected his claim that striking Garrett had been a
“last-minute race neutral decision.”83 In fact, the trial team had put Garrett’s
name on a list of prospective jurors they intended to strike, which they labeled
as jurors who were “definite NO’s.”84 The Court’s reproduction of these notes
and annotations of voir dire documents was accompanied by acknowledgment
that the first five names prosecutors put on their strike list were those of Black
jurors.85 Only the sixth prospective juror on this list was White.86
76 But see Aliza Plener Cover, Hybrid Jury Strikes, 52 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 357,
359 (2017) (“Foster, the anomalous case in which prosecutors documented their
consideration of race during jury selection, provided a forum for the Court to proclaim its
commitment to racial equality, without being forced to confront the flaws in the Batson
regime . . . .”).
77 Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“A
prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not have
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically.”).
78 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. at 1748 (“Despite questions about the background
of particular notes [in the prosecutor’s file], we cannot accept the State’s invitation to blind
ourselves to their existence. We have ‘made it clear that in considering a Batson
objection . . . all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be
consulted.’”) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)); see also Nancy S.
Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and the Peremptory
Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1153 (2017) (“Although the two prosecutors gave many
reasons each time they removed an African-American prospective juror from the jury, the
one reason they were careful not to give was race.”).
79 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. at 1748.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1749.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1749–50.
85 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1750 (2016).
86 Id.
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The decision also relied on records of each prospective juror’s race to
discredit other rationales Lanier advanced for Garrett’s dismissal.87 Though
Lanier highlighted the fact that Garrett was divorced, Justice Roberts noted that
Lanier had failed to strike three White jurors who were also divorced.88 And
though Lanier claimed he was concerned that Garrett was too young, a review
of the trial records revealed that he did not strike eight young White jurors—
including a twenty-one-year-old who was later empaneled.89 Finally, though
Lanier claimed he struck Garrett because of the prospective juror’s close
proximity to the victim’s neighborhood, Justice Roberts observed Lanier’s
failure to strike a White juror who gave an answer during voir dire that was
“practically the same.”90 Each of the Court’s illustrative cases highlighted the
racial identities of jurors who had not been stricken.91
Race was also at the center of Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of Lanier’s
dismissal of a prospective juror named Eddie Hood.92 In rejecting Lanier’s
concern about the similar ages of Hood’s son and the defendant, for example,
the Court noted that Lanier accepted two jurors with similarly-aged sons who
were White.93 Justice Roberts’s rejection of Lanier’s assertion that Hood was
“slow” and “confused” when answering voir dire questions also rested on
comparative disregard of White jurors’ commensurate responses.94 In a similar
vein, the Court’s observation that Lanier empaneled a juror who worked at the
same hospital as the spouse of a Black juror who was dismissed for his
connection to the hospital revealed the hollowness of the prosecutor’s later
claim that because the hospital served “mentally ill people” those associated
with it would be “more sympathetic to the underdog.”95 In this case, as in MillerEl II, the Court’s analysis rested on the premise that a lawyer who struck Black
jurors while empaneling White jurors with similar characteristics acted with
racial animus.96 A prerequisite to this argument was the need to distinguish and
note the names of Black and White prospective jurors.97

87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1750–51.
90 Id. at 1751 (emphasis added).
91 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1753–54 (2016).
92 Id. at 1754.
93 Id. at 1752.
94 Id. at 1753–54.
95 Id. at 1754.
96 See Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North

Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1972 (2016)
(remarking on the history of comparative juror analysis from Miller-El I and Miller-El II to
Foster v. Chatman).
97 See Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 713, 748 (2018) (“[Comparative juror analysis] is akin to multivariable regression
analysis; litigants attempt to show that the two jurors being compared are largely similar
except for one salient characteristic: race.”).
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Three years after Foster, the Court decided Flowers v. Mississippi, 139
S. Ct. 2228 (2019), which only reinforced the centrality of the methodical
documentation of prospective juror demographic characteristics to effectively
challenging and rebutting illegal excusals.98 As a precursor to engaging in
comparative juror analysis, the explicit collection of information related to a
prospective juror’s race and gender offered an organizing framework for Justice
Kavanaugh’s opinion.99 First, the Court noted that the 156 citizens who were
summoned to court for jury selection that day roughly resembled the
demographic makeup of the surrounding county.100 Rather than retroactively
investigate and identify the race of each prospective juror, the Court and others
who have since studied the case relied on the trial court clerk’s explicit
assignment of racial information to each prospective juror.101 White women,
Black women, White men, and Black men were identified as “WF,” “BF,”
“WM,” and “BM,” respectively.102

98 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2246–48 (2019).
99 See, e.g., id. at 2237 (noting that there was “no available racial information” related

to the prospective jurors questioned as part of voir dire in Flowers’s fifth trial other than that
the empaneled jury included “nine white jurors and three black jurors”).
100 Will Craft, How Did Curtis Flowers End Up with a Nearly All-White Jury?, APM
REP. (June 5, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/curtis-flowers-trial-six-juryselection [https://perma.cc/U8NU-L2QA] (noting that of the 156 Montgomery County
residents who reported for jury service in Curtis Flowers’s sixth trial, sixty-six were African
American and eighty-eight were White).
101 See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1047 (Miss. 2014) (subsequent history
omitted).
102 See infra Figures 1 & 2.
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Figure 1: Portion of Clerk’s Copy of Jury List from Curtis Flowers’s Sixth
Trial103

103 This document is on file with the author and was generated by Will Craft, a data
reporter and analyst of American Public Media, which reported on the case. Figure 1 is
presented in excerpted form to protect the privacy of the prospective jurors whose names
were listed.
Marking has been added to this figure by author to indicate where the court clerk has
included notations which reference the gender and race of prospective jurors. Identifying
information has been redacted.
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Circuit courts have likewise taken up comparative strike analysis, with some
viewing the approach as a critical tool for adjudicating Batson challenges.104
Other courts have identified comparative juror analysis as an available—but not
mandatory—technique of evaluation for trial court judges.105 Recognizing the
novelty of this approach, some circuits have given the benefit of the doubt to
prosecutors who claim that their views of prospective jurors were mistaken at
the time of trial.106
104 See, e.g., Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[C]omparative
juror analysis strongly suggests [prosecutor’s] concern was pretextual,” because “[f]ive of
the non-black panelists who ended up being sworn jurors displayed the same pattern in
answering these two questions” as the Black juror who was stricken—a “pattern” that was
in the record but that “neither the district court nor the state court mentioned.”); United States
v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 901, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2011) (vacating and remanding where the trial
court accepted the prosecutor’s seven additional reasons beyond her response during voir
dire as to why she struck a Black juror when a White juror was similarly situated, as the
“government’s reliance on these additional reasons raises the specter of pretext”); Reed v.
Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 378 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Osby’s voir dire testimony, when compared
to the testimony of non-black jurors who gave similar responses, demonstrates that the
reasons the State came up with to justify its strike of Osby,” a prospective black juror, “are
spurious.”); id. at 380–81 (“Thus, the comparative analysis demonstrates what was really
going on: the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to ensure that African-Americans
would not serve on Reed’s jury.”); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
comparative analysis of [the struck juror] with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of
pretext was warranted.”); United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 572 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n
circumstances where the Government’s reason is fantastic or inconsistent with its treatment
of similar non-minority jurors, we may have a basis for reversal.”); State v. Curry, 447 P.3d
7, 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation—that the
Black juror was a young, unemployed college student—applied with equal force to two
White, young, unemployed college students whom the prosecutor did not challenge),
adhered to on reconsideration 302 Or. App. 640 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
105 See Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832, 838–39 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 2773 (2019); McDaniels v. Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Batson’s
third step ‘may include a comparative analysis of the jury voir dire and the jury
questionnaires of all venire members.’”) (quoting Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030
(9th Cir. 2008)) (subsequent history omitted); id. at 776 (“Batson itself neither engaged in
nor required comparative juror analysis.”).
106 See, e.g., Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Juror #
4241 cannot properly be classified as similarly situated to Juror # 0970 because the
prosecutor was unaware of his sister’s conviction. . . . Failure to strike [Juror # 4241],
therefore, cannot be considered evidence of a discriminatory purpose.”); Williams, 264 F.3d
at 572 (denying petitioner’s Batson claim because, even if the stricken Black juror didn’t live
in the petitioner’s same voting district or ward, the defense conceded “this fact was not
known at the time of jury selection and the Government maintains that it believed the venireperson resided in Defendant’s district”); Hosch v. State, 155 So. 3d 1048, 1071–72 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2013) (“The record also does not indicate that the prosecutor’s reason for not
questioning or striking L.T. was anything other than an honest, mistaken belief regarding
L.T.’s feelings about the death penalty as expressed on her juror questionnaire.”); Lee v.
State, 898 So. 2d 790, 815–16 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (finding no discriminatory striking
where the prosecution did not strike a White juror who on her questionnaire expressed
opposition to the death penalty, but struck two Black jurors because they opposed the death
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Comparative strike analysis has also been deployed in state court, though to
idiosyncratic ends.107 In some cases, arbitrary and poorly supported distinctions
have been drawn between Black and White prospective jurors subject to
peremptory strikes.108 In one such California case, the court upheld the strike of
a Black juror, who stated on her juror questionnaire that she “would hesitate to
convict on the word of one witness alone,” despite the fact that two White jurors
with the same questionnaire responses were seated.109 A judge in North Carolina
drew a similarly incredible distinction between a Black pharmaceutical engineer
and White electrical engineer out of concern the former might unfairly interpret
forensic evidence despite the government’s stated intention not to introduce
such evidence.110
The possibility of searching—or comparative—juror analysis, has been
accompanied by efforts to explicitly compile demographic information about
prospective jurors.111 In some cases, lawyers have memorialized the importance
of creating a documentary basis for this analysis in the form of formal
professional guidance, as seen in the case of a federal prosecutor in California
who wrote:
Particularly important is developing a record sufficient to support a
comparative juror analysis regarding selective questioning of jurors and
selective striking of jurors on the basis of the proffered race-neutral rationale.
This may provide the best means of demonstrating that a proffered race-neutral
rationale is not related to the facts and issues of the case to be tried and rests
instead on misplaced assumptions that actually demonstrate group bias.112

Here, despite recognition of the “delicate” nature of this directive, an
attorney saw the value of such record-keeping to the adjudication of Batson

penalty, even if the record showed the Black jurors did not oppose the death penalty)
(subsequent history omitted).
107 See 1 NAT’L JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES app. 4B (Elisabeth
Semel ed., 2020 ed. 1979) (discussing the diversity of approaches and inconsistent
application of comparative juror analysis by trial judges and state courts).
108 See, e.g., Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting).
109 Id. at 1185; cf. Woolf v. State, 220 So. 3d 338, 366, 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)
(finding the stricken Black juror and the two empaneled White jurors were not similarly
situated, even though they all had “similar reservations” about the death penalty, because the
White jurors “did not appear to have the emotional opposition to the death penalty” of the
Black juror who, according to the prosecution and without comment from the petitioner’s
counsel, was “screaming [that she didn’t] believe in the death penalty”) (alteration in
original).
110 See United States v. Carr, No. 4:19-CR-11-FL-1, 2020 WL 254875, at *1, *3
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2020).
111 See, e.g., George S. Cardona & Angela J. Davis, Inside the Box, L.A. LAW., Oct.
2008, at 30–31.
112 Id. at 30.
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challenges on appeal.113 The practical necessity of this orientation toward voir
dire offers a point of departure for more granular empirical attention to the
interplay between antidiscrimination law and everyday legal practice. Law and
society scholars engage in ethnographic studies of legal actors’ language use,
strategy, and professional ethics. For this reason, they are uniquely positioned
to deepen our understanding of the everyday ways that doctrine shapes legal
practice.114

B. Comparative Voir Dire Analysis
A lawyers’ failure to meaningfully question prospective jurors during voir
dire, coupled with her differential questioning or dismissal of prospective jurors
based on race, raise inferences of discriminatory intent.115 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), referred to as “Miller-El I,”
addressed this preliminary problem of disparate treatment, encompassing
lawyers’ questioning throughout voir dire.116 The case involved claims of jury
exclusion in a capital murder case in which the defendant was prosecuted for
the murder of a hotel employee during the robbery of a Holiday Inn in Dallas,
Texas.117 Jury selection took place over a five-week period beginning in

113 See id. at 28.
114 See, e.g., GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY:

DISCOURSE IN THE WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL 5 (2001) (delineating the focus of
the research as an examination of the way that “linguistic processes of persuasion participate
in the ongoing construction and contestation of legal reality”); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE
LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 3–5 (2007); JUSTIN B.
RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT 2–6
(John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2008); RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON
TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES 126–31 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed.,
2017).
115 See, e.g., Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 613 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding the
prosecutor had an opportunity to ask the stricken juror about an inconsistency in voir dire,
“[b]ut he did not”); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 377 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding the
State’s contention that it “generally disfavored healthcare workers in cases involving medical
evidence” to be pretextual, because the prosecutor “did not ask [the juror] anything about
her background as a health care professional or the type of patients she saw”). Courts have
noted the inappropriateness of drawing adverse inferences about attorneys’ motivations in
cases in which judges, rather than lawyers, carry out the questioning of prospective jurors.
See, e.g., Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (referencing Miller ElII and “finding that a prosecutor’s failure to question a juror further was evidence of a
discriminatory motive where the prosecutor was personally questioning the jurors at length
during voir dire”) (citation omitted).
116 See generally Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (subsequent
history omitted).
117 Id. at 327–28.
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February of 1986.118 The trial preceded the Court’s Batson decision.119 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion, however, did not.120
Among the issues raised in the petitioner’s writ of habeus corpus in federal
district court was the prosecutor’s conduct during voir dire.121 Specifically, a
“comparative analysis of the venire members” demonstrated that prospective
jurors faced different questions depending on their race.122 Black jurors were
given a “detailed description of the mechanics of an execution in Texas” before
they were asked to describe their feelings about capital punishment.123 By
contrast, only 6% of White prospective jurors were given the same preface
before prosecutors inquired about their views on the death penalty.124 Instead,
White prospective jurors were invited to share their view of capital punishment
in general terms before indicating whether they felt they could render a fair
verdict in the case before them.125
But the complaint went further. The prosecutors in Miller-El I were also
accused of engaging in a more overtly disparate questioning strategy by eliciting
information about jurors’ willingness to impose mandatory minimum sentences,
which could be grounds for a cause challenge under Texas law at the time.126
Where prosecutors informed 94% of White prospective jurors of the statutory
minimum prison sentence before inquiring about their willingness to impose
such a sentence, most Black prospective jurors were asked leading questions
that prompted them to volunteer steeper sentences that resulted in their
dismissal.127 In this manner, prosecutors were able to selectively elicit
objectionable responses from Black jurors while securing the continued
participation of White jurors—a technique that had more commonly been
deployed by defense attorneys to identify pro-government prospective jurors
with retributivist leanings.128
118 Id. at 328.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 331.
122 Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 331–32.
123 Id. at 332 (including 53% of Black prospective jurors—or eight out of fifteen jurors).
124 Id. at 332.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 332–33 (citing Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),

vacated in part sub nom. Huffman v. Beto, 408 U.S. 936 (1972)).
127 Id. at 333. An example of such a leading question on the part of a prosecutor took the
form of alerting a prospective juror that the maximum sentence for the crime of murder was
life imprisonment, before asking: “Can you give me an idea of just your personal feelings
what you feel a minimum sentence should be for the offense of murder the way I’ve set it
out for you?” Id. (citation omitted). Then, the prosecutor said by way of follow-up: “Again,
we’re not talking about self-defense or accident or insanity or killing in the heat of passion
or anything like that. We’re talking about the knowing [murder] . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
128 See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 333 (“This strategy normally is used by the defense to
weed out pro-state members of the venire, but, ironically, the prosecution employed it
here.”).
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The problems of disparate questioning and lack of meaningful voir dire
persist, reflected by their presence in Flowers v. Mississippi, the most recent
Batson case before the U.S. Supreme Court.129 In this case, a prosecutor
selectively obtained prejudicial information from prospective jurors by shifting
his style of questioning.130 This included, for example, adding “tag questions”
such as, “You’d agree with that, wouldn’t you?” to influence their responses.131
Justice Elena Kagan drew attention to this practice during the case’s oral
argument.132
In addition to highlighting disparities in the number of questions asked of
Black and White prospective jurors in the sixth trial of the now-exonerated
defendant, Curtis Flowers, Justice Kagan commented that such questions were
“targeted” to precipitate the dismissal of particular jurors.133 Questioning
related to the death penalty was of central concern.134 Where prosecutors had
tried to rehabilitate White prospective jurors who were ambivalent about the
death penalty, they questioned Black prospective jurors in a manner that more
readily prompted objectionable responses that warranted their excusal.135
Questions posed to White jurors, for example, might be phrased, “Well, if the
law required you to do it, you could follow the law, couldn't you?”—leading to
an affirmative response.136 Black prospective jurors, Justice Kagan argued,
faced questions like, “[I]t would be really hard for you to apply the death penalty
then, wouldn’t it?”137 Disparate questioning in this context amounted to a
“record for striking Black jurors” and empaneling White jurors.138
State courts, including those in Alabama, Florida, and Texas, have engaged
in comparative voir dire analysis to root out pretextual rationales for peremptory
challenges.139 And courts in some cases have held that in the absence of lines of
questioning addressing meaningful sources of bias or conflicts of interest, such
as working for an organization that had been prosecuted by the District
Attorney’s Office, prosecutors can be presumed to have eliminated a juror on
non-race-neutral grounds.140 Likewise, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
129 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235, 2244, 2248–49 (2019).
130 See id. at 2246–47.
131 See Roger W. Shuy, How a Judge’s Voir Dire Can Teach a Jury What to Say, 6

DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 207, 207–08 (1995) (describing the practice of question tagging and
discussing how questions can be intended to have independent answers and yet be influenced
by other means).
132 See Transcript of Oral Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner at 27–28, Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (No. 17-9572).
133 Transcript of Oral Argument on Behalf of the Respondent, supra note 38, at 50.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 50–51.
136 Id. at 50.
137 Id. at 51.
138 Id. at 51.
139 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 491–92 (1998).
140 See, e.g., Ex parte Nguyen, 751 So. 2d 1224, 1227–28 (Ala. 1999).
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held that the State’s reliance on a “generalized ‘impression’ or ‘experience’” as
a basis for striking a juror who was not subject to fulsome voir dire may be
grounds for inferring pretext.141 Where lawyers directed the same questions to
all jurors, or to diverse subgroups of prospective jurors, state trial courts have
not found Batson violations based on disparate questioning.142
Interdisciplinary legal scholars who have analyzed trial transcripts to
describe the effects of disparate questioning have highlighted jurors’ eagerness
to offer responses that they believe are expected of them.143 These studies
reinforce the commonsense insight that the structure of questions influences the
substance of jurors’ answers.144 One such study of twelve capital trials in North
Carolina, for example, demonstrated the level of control lawyers exercised over
the length and content of juror responses depending on whether questions were
phrased in an open-ended manner and contained affective utterances, such as
expressions of concern or reassurance.145
The U.S. Supreme Court’s now-dominant approaches to adjudicating
Batson violations help explain some of the key empirical findings from Part III
of this Article. They signal, for example, that prosecutors should consider the
style and substance of all of the questions posed to prospective jurors,
recognizing the potential need to defend or initiate comparative analyses of their
own.146 This feature of judicial Batson analysis has significant implications for
the approximately three-quarters of federal courts and one-third of state courts
that permit attorney involvement in the questioning of prospective jurors.147
141 See Tennyson v. State, No. PD-0304-18, 2018 WL 6332331, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App.

Dec. 5, 2018) (Alcala, J., dissenting from refusing discretionary review) (“The State’s lack
of questioning to gain a complete understanding of how its stated reasons would affect a
prospective juror’s ability to render judgment . . . strengthens the inference that its reasons
were not genuine.”).
142 See, e.g., Barksdale v. Dunn, No. 3:08-CV-327-WKW, 2018 WL 6731175, at *89
n.318 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2018) (no discriminatory questioning was found where “the
prosecutor’s questions were addressed to the entire panel of twelve venire members or to
subgroups of each panel that included multiple venire members of both genders,” so that
“there was very little opportunity for discriminatory questioning during voir dire at
Petitioner’s capital murder trial”) (emphasis added) (subsequent history omitted).
143 See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Lawyers and Jurors:
Interrogating Voir Dire Strategies by Analyzing Conversations, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 515, 519–20 (2019).
144 See, e.g., id. at 535, 539–40.
145 Id. at 533–34. Among the affective utterances coded by the researchers were
“concern”; “reassures” or “optimism”; “self-disclosure” by attorney; “empathy”; “laughs or
tells jokes”; and “criticism of . . . others.” Id. at 533.
146 See Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Building a Better Voir Dire Process,
JUDGES’ J., Winter 2008, at 7 (“When voir dire is led by attorneys, prospective jurors are
significantly more likely to be questioned individually for long periods of time, possibly on
matters unrelated to the issues likely to arise at trial.”).
147 Id. at 8 tbl.1 (documenting results of a fifty-state survey in 2007 showing that in state
court 25.9% of jury selection proceedings were exclusively or predominantly managed by
judges, and 19.4% involved the equal participation of judges and lawyers; in federal court,
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III. THE PRACTICE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS JURY SELECTION
To remedy unconstitutional exclusion during jury selection, the Batson
doctrine permits lawyers to challenge the peremptory strikes of adversaries who
dismiss jurors on the basis of race or racial stereotypes.148 These challenges
work backward from the demographics of dismissed jurors, or empaneled juries,
to impute prejudicial and therefore actionable motivations to lawyers accused
of wrongdoing.149 The Batson framework thus represents a post-hoc solution to
glaring instances of misconduct, eschewing alternative approaches, such as
those that focus on prosecutorial ethics and professional responsibility.150
Alongside this retrospective orientation toward discerning illegal bias, scholarly
critiques and empirical studies of jury exclusion have also sought to illuminate
the concealed motives and prejudice of actors through analyses that work
backward from strike patterns and seated-jury demographics.151
These studies reveal the ease and frequency with which prosecutors rely on
pretextual rationales for dismissing jurors.152 These pretextual rationales
include prosecutors’ claims that otherwise eligible prospective jurors are
unsuitable due to their inattentiveness, lack of education, occupations, residence
in particular neighborhoods, or appearances.153 Citing each of these attributes,
prosecutors have been able to defend the rationales for their peremptory strike
decisions on the grounds that they were “race-neutral,” despite their targeted
removal of prospective jurors of color.154
While of critical importance, these studies reinforce the caricature of
unscrupulous and cynical prosecutors we see in some narratives of prosecutorial

jury selection proceedings were exclusively or predominantly managed by judges in 69.6%
of trials and by judges and lawyers equally in 13.6% of trials).
148 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986); supra note 9 (outlining the threestep test that follows a Batson challenge).
149 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98.
150 See Johnson, supra note 139, at 487, 500 (“What then does the Court offer to guide
the ethical prosecutor and trial judge? Silence.”).
151 See, e.g., id. at 502–03 (providing an “egregious example” of a prosecutor that struck
a juror because she had blonde hair, explaining, “It’s been my personal experience that if
somebody is not cognizant of their own reality and existence and want blonde hair, and they
are a black woman, I don’t want them on my jury”).
152 See id. at 492–93.
153 See Marder, supra note 48, at 1590; see also EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 4, 6 (Aug. 2010),
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F2AN-5QUV].
154 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 48, at 1590–91 (“[A]s long as [the prosecutors] gave a
reason that did not explicitly involve race, the judge usually found it to be race neutral.”);
see also, e.g., EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 153, at 6.
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power155 and the inequities of the criminal justice system.156 Though this
attention is well-founded and likely underinclusive of instances of misconduct,
it does not reflect the totality of prosecutorial practice, or attitudes, toward the
jury system.157 A more holistic picture can only emerge when empirical legal
scholars analyze the routine and unceremonious everyday work of prosecutors
who try to conscientiously carry out their work while considering their
professional and personal goals.158 Research on, and alongside, these lawyers
offers unparalleled insight into how antidiscrimination norms actually inform—
or fail to inform—prosecutorial decision-making and strategy when empaneling
juries.159 This section offers a window into this vital and understudied
dimension of voir dire. It highlights the links between the evaluation of
prospective jurors, anxiety about Batson violations, and the common construal
of these violations as referenda on a prosecutor’s character and integrity.160

A. Methods
The empirical analysis that follows is based on an extended field study of
Assistant U.S. Attorneys between 2013 and 2017.161 The broader project of
which it is a part examined prosecutors’ attitudes toward jurors at a time when
jury trials are statistically in decline.162 This study, supported by the National
Science Foundation,163 included my participation in twenty-six federal jury

155 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 176, 177

(2019) (discussing the pervasiveness of generalized claims about prosecutorial power, the
conflation of “power” with “discretion,” and arguing that “[c]onclusory statements about
unchecked prosecutorial power and discretion are ubiquitous and uncontroversial”);
Johnson, supra note 139, at 500 (emphasizing the importance of focusing critiques of Batson
on ethical guidance that can be offered to prosecutors at the trial court level, where there is
little clarity on how to “uphold the Constitution and seek justice” in light of the Supreme
Court’s failure in this arena).
156 See Bellin, supra note 155, at 179.
157 See id. at 174 (“[T]oday’s prosecutorial-power rhetoric is, upon close examination,
frustratingly incoherent.”).
158 See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 838 (2018) (reviewing JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN:
THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION (2017)) (noting that close engagement includes
“think[ing] more deeply about prosecutors’ role in the criminal justice system and the nature
of their power”).
159 Id. at 857 (“Strip away the hype, and prosecutors most resemble ‘worker bees’ toiling
in the criminal justice system, not wizards bending it to their will.”) (citing PAUL BUTLER,
LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 109 (2009)).
160 See Johnson, supra note 139, at 507.
161 Offit, supra note 27, at 1084.
162 See id. at 1074–75.
163 See generally Anna Crindell Offit, Making the Case for Jurors: An Ethnographic
Study of U.S. Prosecutors (Apr. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on file with Princeton University).
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selection proceedings164 and semi-structured interviews with 133 Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.165 Prosecutors faced Batson challenges in four of the jury selection
proceedings observed, and, in one case, challenged defense counsel.166
Though the interviewees and prosecutions discussed are anonymized, the
cases encompassed a sample of prosecutions during the research period—
including human trafficking, healthcare fraud, public corruption, rape, child
pornography, narcotics trafficking, carjacking, bank robbery, and capital
murder, among others.167 I selected a federal office as a case study because of
its practice of summoning jurors from a combination of rural and urban counties
with socio-economically and racially heterogeneous populations and because of
its varied caseload.168
As a case study based on a non-random sample in a single geographic
location, it is fair to question the generalizability of this project. My response is
twofold. First, toward shedding empirical light on broader phenomena, this
study draws its strength from its capacity to build upon other empirical legal and
doctrinal scholarship. It is through this that a more fulsome understanding of
Batson’s impact in general emerges. Second, this study is less concerned with
trends than it is with mechanisms and processes. I am keen to gain perspective
on the ways in which Batson has affected prosecutorial decision-making and
strategy. This creates an avenue for future research which might confirm or
contest the validity of these findings more broadly.

164 See generally id. (discussing numerous jury selection proceedings between 2014 and

2017). To the extent that quotations appear in this Article, they have been modified. Their
purpose is to tease out formulations that emerged as generalizable and representative of
prosecutors who grappled with similar strategic and ethical concerns in preparing for jury
selection.
165 See generally id. (I refer to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, federal prosecutors, and
prosecutors interchangeably reflecting the colloquial usage of my interviewees. The
interviewees of this study worked in both the Criminal and Civil Divisions of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office.) A central tenet of participant observation is its commitment to learning
about research subjects’ experiences and opinions by engaging in work alongside them. My
objective in gathering data about prosecutors’ jury selection practices was to understand and
accurately record decisions they made in their own words and from their own point of view.
If the findings of this study provide little evidence of overt racial animus among prosecutors,
it is because I did not observe such animus during the research period. This does not
disconfirm the findings of studies that argue that American legal proceedings are plagued by
systemic racism. Rather, it suggests that a critical challenge for empirical legal scholars is
illuminating the perpetuation of racial discrimination and exclusion in the absence even as
legal actors strive for greater equity and inclusion.
166 See generally id. None of these challenges resulted in an adjudicated Batson
violation.
167 Id. at xvii.
168 See Anna Offit, Peer Review: Navigating Uncertainty in the United States Jury
System, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 169, 204–06 (2016); Offit, supra note 27, at 1088; supra note
2 and accompanying text.
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With few exceptions,169 studies of jury selection consider the demographics
of empaneled juries rather than address lawyers’ decision-making processes in
real time.170 Building on legal scholarship on jury selection that has relied on
interviews with attorneys171 and former jurors,172 and part-quantitative partqualitative evaluations of attorneys’ on-the-record conversations during voir
dire,173 this Part examines prosecutors’ jury selection strategies based on their
off-transcript discussions of peremptory strike decisions. In so doing, it
highlights unstudied aspects of prosecutors’ decision-making during jury
selection.174

B. Findings
Prosecutors’ accounts of their experiences anticipating and navigating
Batson challenges revealed the centrality of racial information to their
assessments of jurors.175 There was consensus among the prosecutors I
interviewed and observed that jurors’ attitudes toward cases were inherently
unpredictable.176 Prosecutors lamented the lack of useful information elicited
from jurors during voir dire and recognized that regardless of their own efforts,
jury verdicts in criminal cases could be idiosyncratic.177 It was therefore little
comfort that judges in the district routinely delineated the scope of relevant
questioning themselves and often posed questions to prospective jurors without
opportunities for attorney-led follow-up.178 These (generally standardized)
scripts were supplemented by case-specific questions submitted by the attorneys
followed by sidebar questioning that was vetted and often guided by the

169 See, e.g., Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 143, at 516; Offit, supra note 168, at 170–
71; Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note17, at 368–69.
170 See generally ABRAMSON, supra note 35 (examining the relationship between juries
and democratic justice).
171 See Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 17, at 169.
172 See generally ROBIN CONLEY, CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY: HOW LANGUAGE
INFLUENCES JURORS IN CAPITAL CASES (Roger W. Shuy et al. eds., 2016) (recounting jurors’
experiences in court).
173 See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 143 (focusing on attorneys’ methods of
gathering information in voire dire).
174 See Candace McCoy, Prosecution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 682 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011); ANN SOUTHWORTH & CATHERINE L. FISK,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 357 (2d ed. 2014).
175 See, e.g., Interviews with BD, BQ & DL, AUSAs (2013–2017).
176 See, e.g., Interview with BQ, AUSA (2013–2017) (likening the process of discerning
prospective jurors’ responses to reading tea leaves); Interview with CG, AUSA (2013–2017)
(referring to the jury selection process as “way out of your control”).
177 As Preet Bharara, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, put
it: “Once the case goes to twelve ordinary Americans, anything can happen.” PREET
BHARARA, DOING JUSTICE: A PROSECUTOR’S THOUGHTS ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND THE
RULE OF LAW 279 (2019).
178 Offit, supra note 163, at 88–89.

226

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:2

judge.179 As a result, prosecutors found themselves assessing the strangers who
reported for jury service on the basis of scanty information,180 aided by largely
routinized, yes-or-no questions.181 Variations in individual judges’ management
of jury selection made the process only more uncertain.182 Although judge-led
voir dire is more common in federal court, judges are actively involved in state
voir dire nearly 50% of the time.183
Outside the courtroom, prosecutors discovered—through Continuing Legal
Education (CLE) trainings, meetings with supervisors, and the accounts of
colleagues—that Batson challenges were among the most significant disputes
one could face during jury selection.184 Such challenges became a risk,
prosecutors learned, if they excused Black or female prospective jurors from
their venires.185 Though uncommon in practice,186 the adjudication of Batson
challenges represented a frequent source of anxiety for the attorneys in this
study.187 This anxiety imprinted itself on their approaches to jury selection.188

1. Making Race Salient
“Everything you do is being scrutinized,” a prosecutor said during a break
in jury selection proceedings one day.189 “When you’re in court it’s
exhausting . . . the pressure is so intense.”190 Prosecutors readily and repeatedly
shared experiences to this effect, revealing their sensitivity to jurors’, judges’,
and even opposing counsel’s seemingly limitless attention to their speech,

179 See Nancy S. Marder, Juror Bias, Voir Dire, and the Judge-Jury Relationship, 90

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 927, 931 (2015) (noting that voir dire in federal court most commonly
consists of judge-led voir dire).
180 See, e.g., Interviews with AD, AW, BB, BJ, BP, BQ, BT, CA, CF, CG, CX, DH, DN
& DO, AUSAs (2013–2017) (characterizing voir dire in federal court as a “low information”
environment for assessing prospective jurors).
181 In the district that is the subject of this analysis, standardized jury selection questions
included those pertaining to prospective jurors’ counties of residence, occupations, the
occupations of family members living in their households, impressions of/contact with law
enforcement agents, education levels, news outlets, and hobbies, among other questions.
Offit, supra note 163, at 89.
182 See e.g., Interviews with AD & BW, AUSAs (2013–2017).
183 Mize & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 146, at 8 tbl.1 (noting that voir dire is
exclusively or predominantly led by judges 69.6% of the time in federal court; in state court,
voir dire is exclusively or predominantly led by judges 25.9% of the time and led by judges
and lawyers equally in 19.4% of cases).
184 See e.g., Interviews with AO & AY, AUSAs (2013–2017).
185 See e.g., Interviews with EN & EO, AUSAs (2013–2017).
186 Of the twenty-six jury selection proceedings I observed, four of them involved
adjudicated Batson challenges.
187 See e.g., Interviews with AL & AX, AUSAs (2013–2017).
188 See e.g., Interviews with AY & BQ, AUSAs (2013–2017).
189 Interview with AW, AUSA (2013–2017).
190 See id.
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behavior, and appearances.191 Prosecutors were especially concerned about how
their decisions to excuse particular jurors might affect others’ perceptions of
their motivations, biases, and trustworthiness.192
In some cases, prosecutors addressed this anxiety by refraining from using
peremptory challenges altogether.193 Instead, these prosecutors embraced an
inclusive jury selection strategy—referred to by some as the “first twelve in the
box” approach.194 According to this logic,195 prospective jurors’ responses were
viewed as irrelevant; from a juror’s perspective, prosecutors thought, one
critical test of the strength of a prosecutor’s case was her willingness to empanel
any eligible juror.196 This was an approach that prosecutors perceived as
conveying confidence in their cases while eliminating the possibility of having
assessments of jurors scrutinized.197
Beyond the decision to exercise peremptory challenges in the first place,
prosecutors registered concern when discussing the scrutiny they might receive
for particular strike decisions.198 Some prosecutors I spoke with were explicitly
trained to understand they had a legal responsibility to keep considerations of
race, gender, and (to a more ambiguous extent) religious affiliation out of their
assessments of jurors.199 Yet, in a low information environment,200 the very
characteristics that prosecutors were not permitted to consider became essential
heuristics for record-keeping and discussions of prospective jurors.201 In other

191 See, e.g., Interview with BW, AUSA (2013–2017) (describing a juror who told him
at the conclusion of a trial that he should consider wearing socks that matched the color of
his shirts).
192 See, e.g., Interview with DL, AUSA (2013–2017).
193 See Interview with CW, AUSA (2013–2017).
194 See id. (likening the jury selection process to a “crapshoot”); see also Offit, supra
note 168, at 178 (citing Interview with CH, AUSA (2013–2017) (commenting that the only
outlier in preparation for a criminal case is the opinion of jurors: “We don’t walk into court
unless we know we have all the evidence . . . . [T]he only variable—the only outlier—is the
jury. You never know what a jury’s going to care about”)).
195 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2003)
(discussing the analogous context of prosecutorial exercises of discretion in charging
decisions aimed at facilitating the re-trial of civil rights cases). A limitation of the
instrumentalism that is part of explicitly “dispassionate and objective” approaches to
discriminating litigants (or jurors) is its “lack[ of] candor” which “risks unfairness” to all.
Id.
196 See, e.g., Interviews with CN & CW, AUSAs (2013–2017).
197 See, e.g., Interviews with AK & CD, AUSAs (2013–2017).
198 See, e.g., Interview with DR, AUSA (2013–2017).
199 This explicit training came in the form of a Continuing Legal Education presentation
shortly before the start of the research period and produced written materials that were
circulated throughout the office and available for retrieval through an online resource bank.
200 See Offit, supra note 168, at 172 (noting prosecutors’ consensus that due to broad
judicial discretion to limit the quantity and substance of questions posed to jurors, limited
information could be gleaned through the jury selection process).
201 See, e.g., Interview with DN, AUSA (2013–2017).

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

228

[Vol. 82:2

words, inferences about jury psychology often rested on small aspects of jurors’
identities.202
Still, though dependent on these heuristics, some prosecutors were so
concerned that a Batson challenge would effectively brand them as racist in
court that they developed fulsome lists of jurors’ responses that could be used
to justify disqualification.203 This way, if prosecutors were later questioned
about their decisions to peremptorily strike jurors, they would have
unobjectionable explanations at hand.204 A goal in taking notes on jurors, as one
prosecutor explained it, was to “make sure you kept a good enough record so
that if you got a challenge two years later on appeal you could say I didn’t strike
that person because of race or gender, but here are six facts I wrote down on
paper that say why I didn’t like a person.”205
Other prosecutors felt that considerations of race were best avoided because
they might obscure information about jurors that was more relevant to the case
under consideration.206 Once, a prosecutor shared an account of a case in which
his trial partner was fixated on the possibility of a Batson challenge during their
discussions about jury selection.207 Both opposed striking one potential juror
but for two very different reasons.208 One prosecutor liked the fact that the juror
was a nurse who likely possessed the expertise to “call bullshit” on the
defendant, a doctor, and draw on her professional experience to substantiate her
views.209 By contrast, the trial partner felt the juror should not be stricken
because she was a Hispanic woman who might empathize with the defendant.210
For the second lawyer, the nurse’s empanelment would not only be important to
defense counsel because of her knowledge and perspective, but might
precipitate a Batson challenge following her dismissal.211
If prosecutors feared being the target of a challenge, many also felt uneasy
about targeting others.212 One civil division prosecutor, who defended a federal
agency in an employment discrimination case, for example, considered
challenging the plaintiff for dismissing a Hispanic man from the jury pool.213
He ultimately decided against it.214 “If I had challenged him,” the prosecutor
recalled, “[the plaintiff] could have come up with a non-discriminatory reason—
but would I offend the jury? Would they hear this? They shouldn’t hear this—
202 See, e.g., Interview with BD, AUSA (2013–2017).
203 Interviews with BV, DC, DE & DN, AUSAs (2013–2017).
204 See, e.g., Interview with DR, AUSA (2013–2017).
205 Interview with BV, AUSA (2013–2017).
206 See, e.g., Interview with CM, AUSA (2013–2017).
207 Interview with BG, AUSA (2013–2017).
208 Id.
209 See I-13 Participation in jury selection proceedings with DV & AD, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
210 Interview with BG, AUSA (2013–2017).
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Interview with AY, AUSA (2013–2017).
213 Interview with CV, AUSA (2013–2017).
214 Id.
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but who knows. And maybe the judge would not be happy with plaintiff’s
counsel.”215 In this case, the prosecutor viewed the process of raising a Batson
challenge as so uncertain and unpredictable that he worried about the effect of
such a challenge on the rest of the venire.216
Prosecutors’ personal experiences of prejudice and racism also influenced
the way they exercised Batson challenges in response to defense counsel’s
conduct.217 One lawyer noted, for example, that as a prosecutor of color he was
sensitive to the inclusivity of jury selection proceedings.218 He explained that
there were not many Black federal practitioners in the district.219 As a result, he
said he was all the more “cognizant of whether I use my strikes or they use theirs
against people of color. ”220 For this prosecutor, attention to the racial identities
of colleagues, adversaries, and jurors permeated his experience practicing
law.221 He thus valued the opportunity Batson afforded him to hold defense
attorneys accountable if he perceived them to use exclusionary tactics to
influence the demographics of a jury panel.222
Other prosecutors refrained from striking prospective jurors out of concern
that even an unfounded Batson challenge could be a source of acute
embarrassment and discomfort.223 Fear of being labeled as racist was a
significant deterrent for such prosecutors, who chose to direct their attention to
other aspects of trial preparation.224 In some cases, concern about being viewed
as racist prompted prosecutors to avoid challenging jurors altogether.225 One
prosecutor described leaving an office-wide CLE presentation on jury selection
feeling so “scared” she might be challenged for dismissing a juror for “legal and
appropriate” reasons that she did not want to risk confrontation.226 She was
therefore reluctant to challenge jurors at all.227 Another prosecutor’s selfconsciousness left her feeling limited to striking White jurors when faced with
a predominantly White venire.228
Prosecutors’ self-conscious attention to the gender of prospective jurors,
also prohibited under Batson, exhibited similar patterns.229 On some occasions,
prosecutors’ concerns about the personal and reputational stakes of potential

215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., Interview with AN, AUSA (2013–2017).
218 Interview with CW, AUSA (2013–2017).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., Interview with CP, AUSA (2013–2017).
224 See, e.g., Interview with DN, AUSA (2013–2017).
225 Id.
226 See Interview with AO, AUSA (2013–2017).
227 See id.
228 See Interviews with CR & DK, AUSAs (2013–2017).
229 See, e.g., Interview with EO, AUSA (2013–2017).

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

230

[Vol. 82:2

Batson challenges led them to err on the side of deliberately excusing women.230
This was true, for example, of a rape case I observed.231 Concerned that all of
the prospective jurors on their strike list were men, the trial team eagerly
revisited the notes they had taken during voir dire in the hope of identifying
women they could plausibly excuse.232 They discovered that one female
prospective juror had referred to herself as “kooky” and “out there”—and
another noted that her daughter had been a victim of sexual assault.233 Though
both women had insisted that they could serve as fair and impartial jurors, the
prosecutors decided to remove them rather than face a potential Batson
challenge.234 If not for their Batson-related concerns, a prosecutor explained,
they would unquestionably have seated these prospective jurors, since neither
of them had identified grounds for excusal at first glance.235
This approach, however, was not shared by all. Other prosecutors were
skeptical of assessments that took a juror’s gender into account.236 In some
cases, their views stemmed from past trial experiences.237 Citing a case in which
a female plaintiff with breast cancer sued the government, for example, a Civil
Division prosecutor explained that his “knee-jerk” reaction had been to avoid
empaneling female jurors on the theory they might sympathize with the
plaintiff.238 Conversations with colleagues, however, convinced him that his
intuitions were off-base under the circumstances.239 He explained that others
who had tried these types of cases felt they did “better” with female jurors,
because women expected other women to “take some responsibility and look
out for themselves” to a greater extent than a male juror would.240 He therefore
attributed his sense of the irrelevance of gender considerations to colleagues’
case experiences rather than concern about Batson.241
Another dominant explanation that prosecutors offered for considering the
race or gender of a prospective juror was a strategic one: Recording these
characteristics was essential to defending oneself in the adjudication of the
second step of a Batson challenge, should it arise.242 Prosecutors worried that if
they failed to explicitly assign racial identities to jurors, they might unwittingly
230 See, e.g., Interview with BD, AUSA (2013–2017).
231 See, e.g., Interviews with EN & EO, AUSAs (2013–2017).
232 Id.
233 See I-11 Participation in jury selection proceedings with DP & DQ, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Interviews with BB & BS, AUSAs (2013–2017).
237 See Interview with BB, AUSA (2013–2017).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 See Melilli, supra note 23, at 447 (“The procedure for these challenges requires that

the lawyer specify the reasons for the challenge, and that the trial judge ultimately rule upon
the legitimacy of the challenge.”).
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break the law if their decisions were challenged.243 And the same might be true
of judges whose anticipation of a possible appeal led them to pay special
attention to—and often record—the racial identities of jurors they excused from
their courtrooms.244
Despite succumbing to supervisors’ and colleagues’ pressure to
preemptively classify prospective jurors along racial lines, some prosecutors
still commented on the paradox of feeling analytically dependent on the very
characteristics they were not legally meant to consider.245 One prosecutor
explained that “from a policy standpoint,” Batson reinforced the classifications
it was designed to eliminate: “It’s supposed to prevent you from taking race into
account,” he said, “but in fact makes you think of it more.”246
In this vein, several prosecutors noted that their familiarity with Batson
made them only more attuned to race during jury selection.247 Since jurors were
not asked to share their own racial identities, these designations involved
guesswork.248 In many cases, prosecutors perceived a prospective juror’s race
as ambiguous.249 During jury selection proceedings in one case, for example, a
prosecutor asked a colleague whether to identify a particular juror as
Dominican.250 In another case, a prosecutor commented that she was trying to
locate references to a prospective juror who she recalled identifying as
Hispanic.251 The challenge of confidently assigning broad racial categories was
compounded for prosecutors by the fact that some prospective jurors identified
themselves as biracial.252
During jury selection in one criminal case, a prosecutor and her colleague
disagreed about the appropriateness of recording racial information about
prospective jurors.253 The lead prosecutor insisted, like many of her colleagues,
that it was essential to “keep track of race” as a Batson challenge contingency
plan.254 And in cases that involved written jury questionnaires, racial identities
243 See, e.g., Interviews with AC & DL, AUSAs (2013–2017).
244 See, e.g., Interview with AM, AUSA (2013–2017); see also Interview with AI,

AUSA (2013–2017) (noting that a judge assigned racial identities to each prospective juror
on record during the adjudication of a Batson challenge).
245 See Interview with AM, AUSA (2013–2017).
246 Id.
247 See, e.g., Interviews with AM & DL, AUSAs (2013–2017).
248 Id.
249 See, e.g., Interview with BQ, AUSA (2013–2017).
250 See I-2 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AL & AX, AUSAs (2013–
2017).
251 See I-7 Participation in jury selection proceedings with BF, AUSA (2013–2017).
252 See Emily Rose Margolis, Color as a Batson Class in California, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
2067, 2086–88 (2018) (noting the growing rate of biracial identification and the benefit that
would be conferred by recognizing “color” rather than race as a class for the purposes of
antidiscrimination law).
253 Interviews with CR, DL & DN, AUSAs (2013–2017).
254 See I-7 Participation in jury selection proceedings with BF, AUSA (2013–2017); see
also Interviews with CR, DL & DN, AUSAs (2013–2017).
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were sometimes associated with jurors in hindsight, after their follow-up
questioning was complete.255 After sharing a favorable assessment of a retired
government employee whose questionnaire she reviewed, for example, a
prosecutor flagged for her colleague that the juror was Black.256 Another person
who a prosecutor identified as a “favorite” potential juror was then identified as
Black as well; in the event the prosecutor was accused of harboring racial
animus in deciding to excuse one Black prospective juror, it was important to
her that another Black juror be empaneled.257
In jury selection proceedings that involved questionnaires that trial teams
could review and discuss in advance, the presumed racial identities of
prospective jurors were appended to lists of issues flagged for follow-up in case
these jurors were subject to future peremptory strikes.258 In one case, a trial team
struggled with the fact that a Black prospective juror commented during jury
selection that she did not find children to be reliable witnesses.259 After a
supervisor told the trial team to anticipate a Batson challenge after striking any
person of color, the juror’s responses to a number of other questions were
revisited cautiously.260 The trial team worried that even a legitimate source of
concern about the juror at issue might not withstand a future Batson challenge
and wondered if the juror’s troubling responses to other questions would aid
their defense of such challenges.261 Exasperated by this exercise, a member of
the trial team lamented the fact that race should factor into their deliberations at
all.262 His colleague, however, urged caution, recognizing the seriousness of a
challenge by defense counsel.263
Time and again, prosecutors found themselves weighing problematic juror
responses against the possibility of a Batson challenge that would lead to the
public and humiliating scrutiny of sufficiently thoughtful rationales for juror
dismissals.264 Overall, the empirical data here suggest two things. First, Batson
affects trial processes, decision-making, and activities like note-taking by
pushing prosecutors to consider whether questioning, striking, and justifications
align with antidiscrimination principles.
Second, the efficacy of the Batson challenge is in large part a function of
the perceived costs involved. On the one hand, prosecutors consider their incourt, case-specific reputations: Winning a case before a jury is much easier if

255 See, e.g., Interview with AY, AUSA (2013–2017).
256 Id.
257 See I-7 Participation in jury selection proceedings with BF, AUSA (2013–2017).
258 See, e.g., Interview with AI, AUSA (2013–2017).
259 See, e.g., Interviews with DN & EN, AUSAs (2013–2017).
260 I-13 Participation in jury selection proceedings with DV & AD, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 See, e.g., Interview with BQ, AUSA (2013–2017).
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the jury does not think you are racist or sexist.265 On the other hand, prosecutors
consider their professional reputations.266 Beyond instrumental concern about
the possibility of later appeal, the negative valence of racism and sexism in
American society at-large, coupled with public scrutiny of exclusion at the
hands of prosecutors, heightened Assistant U.S. Attorneys’ desire to avoid
patterns of professional behavior indicative of animus toward particular groups.
A challenge, it seemed to many, was not just a procedural issue—it was a
personal one.267

2. Race-Conscious Inclusion
To avoid the stigma associated with an accusation of harboring racial bias,
a number of federal prosecutors made a concerted effort to empanel Black jurors
and challenge White jurors whenever possible.268 As a matter of intra-unit
policy, one prosecutor recalled being told by a supervisor that if there was one
Black prospective juror in the venire, prosecutors should refrain from excusing
him or her in the absence of extenuating circumstances.269 It struck this
prosecutor as strange that his colleagues’ approaches to jury selection appeared
to necessitate racial distinctions rather than erase them.270
This strategy sometimes resulted in the empanelment of jurors whose
responses during voir dire worried prosecutors.271 This included a juror who
later left the courtroom in the middle of a bank robbery trial without
explanation.272 In another case, it involved seating a juror who denied having
negative feelings toward a law enforcement officer who killed a member of his
family—a response the trial team found implausible.273 For others, the raceconsciousness introduced by concern about Batson challenges led them to seek
Black jurors in prosecutions of Black defendants.274
A related consequence of this race-conscious orientation was prosecutors’
willingness to dismiss otherwise eligible White prospective jurors who did not
raise concern during jury selection.275 This was true, for example, in the case of
a man who commented during one-on-one questioning that he worried a
prosecutor could manipulate a cooperating witness.276 Here, the trial team
265 See, e.g., Interview with AG, AUSA (2013–2017).
266 See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013–2017).
267 I-17 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AL & AX, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
268 I-12 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AI & AV, AUSAs (2013–2017).
269 Interviews with CM & CP, AUSAs (2013–2017).
270 Id.
271 I-10 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EP & BI, AUSAs (2013–2017).
272 Interview with CR, AUSA (2013–2017).
273 Interview with DK, AUSA (2013–2017).
274 I-9 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EO & EN, AUSAs (2013–2017);

I-10 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EP & BI, AUSAs (2013–2017).
275 See, e.g., Interview with CM, AUSA (2013–2017).
276 I-10 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EP & BI, AUSAs (2013–2017).
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expressed no qualms about quickly moving the juror “up” its strike list—noting
defense counsel would be indifferent if the trial team “struck a White guy.”277
Prosecutors also explicitly referenced prospective jurors’ racial identities
when revisiting notes to confirm they had been “consistent” in the way they
discussed “analogous” jurors.278 This included flagging Black and White jurors
who said during voir dire that they had voted to acquit defendants in past cases
to ensure that commensurate follow-up questions were asked of them.279
In some cases, prosecutors’ self-consciousness about potential Batson
challenges prompted useful scrutiny of their own biases and preconceptions.
Once, thinking about gender, a prosecutor said she regularly considered a
prospective juror’s “gender combined with age.”280 She worried that in cases
with a “thirty to thirty-five-year-old male defendant of any race,” a young
female juror might feel attracted to him and unduly sympathetic.281 She
explained that such defendants could appear to be the “strong, silent type—'he’s
a little risqué and a little interesting[,] and he’s a little cute sitting there.’”282
Under these circumstances, striking young women felt necessary to the
prosecutor.283 Other female prosecutors excused women from juries out of
concern that such jurors might feel judgmental or competitive with them.284
Where some prosecutors embraced Batson’s deterrent effect on impermissible
considerations, others acknowledged the continuing impact of gender
stereotypes on their thinking.285
Concern about potential Batson challenges also led prosecutors to consider
whether race-based jury exclusion might be exacerbated by excusing jurors for
having characteristics that could be viewed as “proxies” for race.286 Prosecutors
worried, for example, about the implications of a routine question that was asked
of jurors in federal court related to whether they owned or rented their homes.287
It struck some prosecutors as problematic that colleagues viewed homeowners
as more likely than renters to condemn criminal activity that might adversely
affect the value of their property and quality of their lives—suggesting they had
a more significant stake in the safety of their communities.288 If jurors’
responses to this question led to the dismissal of one or two Hispanic prospective
jurors, one prosecutor explained, he expected to hear defense counsel accuse
277 I-10 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EP & BI, AUSAs (2013–2017).
278 See, e.g., I-36 Participation in jury selection proceedings with DL, AUSA (2013–

2017).
279 Id.
280 Interview with BD, AUSA (2013–2017).
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 See I-34 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AI, AV & AV, AUSAs

(2013–2017); see also Interview with BO, AUSA (2013–2017).
285 See, e.g., Interview with DN, AUSA (2013–2017).
286 See, e.g., Interview with CE, AUSA (2013–2017).
287 Cf. Interview with DD, AUSA (2013–2017).
288 See, e.g., Interview with BD, AUSA (2013–2017).
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him of “coming up with excuses” to empanel White jurors who were more likely
to own their apartments or houses.289 Another prosecutor struggled with his
inclination to empanel jurors who said they trusted police officers in light of his
understanding of the relationship between race, mass incarceration, and
resultant skepticism about law enforcement.290 Everything he “knew from data
and statistics,” he explained, he was not “allowed to consider and take into
account.”291
During jury selection proceedings in a white-collar case, defense attorneys
challenged prosecutors for dismissing an unemployed female juror who stated
that she “did not have hobbies” and could not remember the name of the
company for which her mother manufactured goods in a factory.292 The defense
attorney argued that the prosecutors’ actual cause for concern was the juror’s
ethnic background.293 The government’s stated rationales, in his view,
functioned as a pretext for a characteristic that could not be considered.294
Because Batson did not protect against exclusion on the basis of socio-economic
status, the prospective juror’s low-wage job and lack of discretionary time
fueled a challenge on the grounds that she had actually been dismissed because
of her race.295 Though numerous jurors presented themselves as unemployed,
underemployed, or subject to low-wage, unpredictable work schedules, racial
considerations—and not those related to socio-economic status—remained
dominant in prosecutors’ preparation and discussion.296
In some cases, prosecutors’ apprehension about potential challenges led
them to misapply the law by preempting judges’ determinations of prima facie
cases of discrimination with rationales for their peremptory strikes.297 Though
the adjudication of a Batson challenge proceeded in three steps, with prosecutors
only offering explanations for strikes after judges had determined a case for
discrimination had effectively been made, the gap between law and practice was
in full display during jury selection.298 Prosecutors were sometimes so
distressed by Batson challenges that they rushed to offer “neutral” reasons for
their strikes before district court judges had determined that the first of Batson’s
three steps had been satisfied.299 One prosecutor speculated that her colleagues’
289 Interview with CM, AUSA (2013–2017).
290 Id.
291 Interview with CP, AUSA (2013–2017).
292 I-17 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AL & AX, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 I-42 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AY & BQ, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
298 Id.
299 I-17 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AL & AX, AUSAs (2013–

2017); I-31 Participation in jury selection proceedings with CD, AUSA (2013–2017); I-20
Participation in jury selection proceedings with DL & DT, AUSAs (2013–2017).
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eagerness to prematurely offer reasons for dismissing jurors stemmed from the
unsettling experience of having their integrity questioned.300 When “called a
racist,” she explained, a prosecutor instinctively felt compelled to defend
herself.301 Other prosecutors noted feeling “indignant” and “emotional” when
challenged.302
Prosecutors’ consideration of prospective jurors’ racial identities had
concrete effects on how they empaneled juries, though not in a uniform or
predictable manner. For some, attention to race expressed itself in the inclusion
of supplemental voir dire questions designed to root out prejudicial views
among prospective jurors.303 Though judges and defense attorneys did not
always honor these requests, nearly all of the prosecutors I interviewed who
prepared for voir dire in criminal cases requested that jurors be asked whether
they had personal feelings about members of any ethnic or racial group (or some
variation) that would make it difficult for them to be fair.304 Under these
circumstances, and citing Batson, a prosecutor expressed frustration that jury
selection—which was supposed to be “race-neutral”—nonetheless featured an
explicit question about race.305 “Internally I wanted to fight it,” the prosecutor
said, “but I took a step back and we ultimately let the judge ask the question.”306
He thus resigned himself to this counterintuitive mode of inquiry,
acknowledging that he would not want to see a defendant convicted on the basis
of a juror’s prejudice rather than on the strength of the case.307
Other prosecutors welcomed the opportunity to discuss racial issues in the
open. One prosecutor, for example, said that to the extent that antidiscrimination
norms were reinforced during voir dire, jurors might be less likely to tolerate
racist sentiments that could arise during their deliberations.308 Still others were
eager to elicit evidence of jurors’ prejudicial thinking toward prosecutors.309
Since lawyers were no less vulnerable to racist ideation, prosecutors worried
they might be targets of discrimination themselves.310 When a prospective juror
responded affirmatively to a question about racial prejudice, for example, a
prosecutor was shocked: “Is she serious? She’s got to be kidding. Well that isn’t
good for me. The judge excused her because she doesn’t like Black people!”311
In another case, a prosecutor’s observation that a prospective juror immigrated
300 See, e.g., Interview with DL, AUSA (2013–2017).
301 I-9 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EO & EN, AUSAs (2013–2017);

I-10 Participation in jury selection proceedings with EP & BI, AUSAs (2013–2017).
302 Interview with CM, AUSA (2013–2017).
303 See, e.g., Interview with AN, AUSA (2013–2017).
304 See generally Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 843 (2015).
305 Interview with CW, AUSA (2013–2017).
306 Id.
307 Interview with CW, AUSA (2013–2017).
308 Interview with BN, AUSA (2013–2017).
309 Interviews with AN & CW, AUSAs (2013).
310 Id.
311 Interviews with DT & AN, AUSAs (2013–2017).
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from China precipitated a joking comment from a member of the trial team that,
as a Chinese American prosecutor, he felt confident “his people” would be loyal
to him.312
These findings, on the link between race-consciousness and professional
and personal considerations, corroborate conclusions drawn elsewhere. One
interview-based study, for example, noted the extent to which prosecutors
internalized anti-racist norms in their approaches to voir dire313 and that even
the possibility of a Batson challenge had an “educating effect” on lawyers’
thinking.314 These authors also highlighted the stigmatizing potential of the law,
describing one prosecutor’s “depth of feelings on the issue” in the following
terms:
[A] prosecutor reported being so upset at a lengthy Batson hearing out of the
jury's presence as to ask, “Judge, are you going to brand me as a racist because
I exercised a peremptory?” and was mildly rebuked by the court. (Resp. #49,
Pros.) “I try not to—not just because of Batson—I try not to let race influence
my decision about jurors.” (Resp. #13, Pros.) One defense attorney did not
recall a prosecutor ever removing an African American juror on voir dire.
(Resp. #12, Crim. Def.)315

This Article, which draws together interview and observational data, shows
what this “educating” effect entails and compels in practice. The evidence
indicates an explicit link between considering Batson (challenges, violations)
and a race-conscious approach to jury selection. This race-conscious approach
animates various behaviors, including the scrupulous collection of demographic
data and decisions to empanel some jurors over others. At the same time, one
cannot rule out the possibility that race-consciousness has allowed some
prosecutors, who aim to discriminate, to engage in exclusionary empanelment,
albeit with the cover afforded by an apparent sensitivity to inclusivity.
In any case, empirical legal research on criminal jury selection reveals the
striking extent to which Batson features as a key element in the calculus for
striking or not striking jurors. To understand why this is, however, requires that
one consider the actual adjudication of Batson violations. If prosecutors are
making race central to their evaluations of jurors, it is, as we have seen, because
of the dominant techniques courts use to determine if a juror has been the victim
of race-based exclusion.

312 I-42 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AY & BQ, AUSAs (2013–

2017).
313 See Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 17, at 369–71.
314 Id. at 389. The authors of this study interviewed both criminal and civil litigators for

a sample that included attorneys drawn from forty-four trials that took place during
consecutive months during the late 1990s. Id. at 187.
315 Id. at 369.
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IV. BRINGING EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS TO BATSON REFORM
The story of Batson has been one of expansion—a fact that is at times
underappreciated in scholarship that focuses primarily on the framework’s
limitations.316 From its roots in the criminal trial, the Batson framework has
been extended to civil trials317 and to defense counsel.318 There has also been
an expansion of the demographic groups afforded protection against
discriminatory empanelment. In addition to exclusion based on race, dismissal
based on gender319 and ethnicity320 is now also prohibited.321
Yet, as a burgeoning empirical literature shows, the struggle to bring our
jury system into alignment with its constitutional blueprint remains
unfinished.322 The diversity of American jury pools often does not translate to
diverse, representative juries.323 This is a problem that requires attention and
continued reform.

A. Persistence of the Problem
Judges and prosecutors disproportionately excuse Black jurors, while
defense attorneys disproportionately excuse White jurors.324 The persistence of
this pattern has led some legal scholars and practitioners to accept not only that

316 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 48, at 1589–92.
317 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that the

race-based exclusion of prospective jurors is impermissible in civil trials).
318 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
319 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that challenging a
prospective juror on the basis of that juror’s gender is unconstitutional).
320 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality
opinion) (expanding Batson protections to discrimination against Hispanic and Latino
prospective jurors—referred to interchangeably in the opinion).
321 Depending on one’s jurisdiction, exclusion on the basis of sexual orientation or
religious affiliation may also be prohibited. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Batson protects against discrimination
based on the sexual orientation of a prospective juror). For a discussion of state cases
prohibiting the exclusion of prospective jurors based on religion, see generally Caroline R.
Krivacka & Paul D. Krivacka, Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Persons from
Criminal Jury Based on Religious Affiliation—Post-Batson State Cases, 63 A.L.R. 5th 375
(1998).
322 See infra Part IV.A.
323 See infra Part IV.A.
324 Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1426 (documenting, in a North Carolina state court case
study, that judges and prosecutors removed nonwhite jurors at higher rates than they removed
White jurors). They also noted that “defense attorneys nearly rebalanced the levels of jury
service among races by removing more jurors than the judges or the prosecutors did and by
using their peremptory challenges more often against White jurors than they did against
black and other nonwhite jurors.” Id.
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race-neutrality is an unattainable mandate, but that race-based exclusion is an
inescapable feature of legal strategy in the criminal justice system.325
This conclusion is founded on mounting evidence of continued juror
discrimination and the perpetuation of exclusionary practices aimed at
empaneling disproportionately White juries.326 This evidence is furnished in
various ways. One approach elucidates patterns of racial bias in prosecutors’
peremptory strike decisions by examining the demographics of stricken and
empaneled juries.327 This research relies on mixed methods.328 In one case, for
instance, scholars used publicly available court data, transcript analysis, and
interviews with former jurors to uncover the persistence of jury exclusion in
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Tennessee.329 Strikingly, the study found that between 2005 and 2009,
prosecutors used peremptory challenges to remove 80% of qualified Black
prospective jurors from capital case venires in Houston County, Alabama.330 In
Jefferson County, Louisiana, prosecutors struck Black prospective jurors from
panels more than three times as often as they struck White prospective jurors in
2003.331
Comparable strike patterns have been found in North Carolina. For
example, a study of prosecutors’ peremptory strikes in capital cases between
1990 and 2010 revealed that prosecutors removed 52.6% of eligible Black jurors
325 See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2271 (2019) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (“[He] would return to [the Court’s] pre-Batson understanding—that race matters
in the courtroom—and thereby return to litigants one of the most important tools to combat
prejudice in their cases.”); see also Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”: “Ethical”
Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 528–31 (1998) (defending
the ability of defense attorneys to consider the racial makeup of the jury as one, among other,
strategic considerations aimed at zealously advocating for their clients).
326 See Marder, supra note 48, at 1588–91 (arguing that among Batson’s shortcomings,
lawyers are able to circumvent Batson challenges by offering false or pretextual rationales
for excusing jurors, trial judges are reluctant to find that Batson has been violated, and
appellate courts are deferential to trial courts when reviewing challenges).
327 See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1423–29.
328 Compare id. at 1425–29 (utilizing primarily data analysis), with EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE, supra note 153, at 28 (combining data analysis with interviews to examine the
impact of exclusion).
329 See generally EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 153. In the case of Florida,
research has also examined the relationship between the racial composition of juries and trial
outcomes between 2000 and 2010. See Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi
Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1019, 1032–
40 (2012).
330 EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 153, at 14.
331 Two non-capital studies analyze single parishes in Louisiana: Robert J. Smith &
Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race Continues to Influence the Administration of Criminal
Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 361, 387 (2012) (analyzing Jefferson Parish, Louisiana),
and URSULA NOYE, REPRIEVE AUSTL., BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY
DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE 9 (Aug. 2015), http://www.criiasupr.org/multimedia/documents/Blackstrikes%20
Caddo%20Parish%20August%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHA5-EY5M].
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and only 25.7% of other eligible jurors.332 In a different case study of noncapital felony trials in North Carolina, researchers demonstrated that although
Black prospective jurors constituted approximately one third of the venire,
prosecutors used 60% of their peremptory strikes to remove them.333
It is critical to note that while much research has been done in the American
South, these patterns are not geographically isolated. Other studies have arrived
at similar conclusions with respect to jury selection practices in Los Angeles
County (California), Maricopa County (Arizona), the Bronx (New York),
Washington, D.C.,334 and North Carolina.335 Further, the pattern is not restricted
to state courts. In fact, the aforementioned findings are consistent with those of
a recent review of every race-based Batson challenge in federal court between
2000 and 2009.336
Explanations for the persistence of race-based exclusion have focused on
the ease with which prosecutors motivated by racial animus can use the cover
afforded by peremptory challenges to engage in exclusionary voir dire
practices.337 This is made possible, in part, by limited guidance on how to draw
the line between “neutral” and pretextual rationales for excusing jurors if an
attorney’s reasoning appears to be accurate and consistently applied to others in
a jury pool.338 Increasingly, it is clear that whatever the virtues of peremptory
challenges, which permit lawyers to react to “unaccountable prejudices” based

332 Pollitt & Warren, supra note 96, at 1963–64.
333 Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender

Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 698–99 (1999)
(presenting an empirical case study of jury selection in a North Carolina county).
334 See Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann & Jeremy Blair Smith, A Multidimensional Examination
of Jury Composition, Trial Outcomes, and Attorney Preferences 9 (June 27, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.uh.edu/~jlehman2/papers/lehmann_
smith_jurycomposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/853N-BKPT]).
335 See Rose, supra note 333, at 699 (analyzing non-capital felony criminal jury trials in
North Carolina and finding that prosecutors and defense attorneys were more likely to strike
African American and White jurors, respectively). See generally Wright et al., supra note 3.
336 Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare more than
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1092, 1102 (2011) (finding that “in a broad array of cases, as exemplified by Hamilton
and Cook, attorneys articulate and judges accept ‘race-neutral’ explanations for peremptory
strikes that either highly correlate with race or are silly, trivial, or irrelevant to the case”).
337 See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2234–35 (2019) (holding that
Mississippi District Attorney Doug Evans purposefully excluded Black prospective jurors
during voir dire in the capital prosecution of a Black defendant); Marder, supra note 48, at
1588–91 (noting the ease with which prosecutors can justify the disparate exclusion of Black
prospective jurors during voir dire).
338 See Melilli, supra note 23, at 489 (noting the extent to which peremptory strike
rationales such as assertions that prospective jurors are “‘timid,’ create an ‘unfavorable
impression,’ ‘answered no voir dire questions,’ are ‘assertive,’ are ‘liberal or lenient,’ are
‘eager to serve’ or are ‘emotional’” are subjective assessments that would be unlikely to
justify a cause challenge).
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on even “bare looks and gestures,”339 they afford lawyers a form of opaque
discretion that makes them susceptible to abuse.340
As this shows, empirical scholarship has established that the Batson
framework is not immune to exploitation by lawyers.341 An additional constraint
is imposed by the low frequency with which Batson challenges prevail at trial342
and on appeal.343 One study of U.S. court of appeals cases between 2002 and
2010, for example, found that prosecutors attempted to strike Black prospective
jurors in close to 90% of the 184 cases examined.344 The study also found that
those who appealed the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes succeeded in
their challenges in only 12.3% of cases.345 Litigants tended to prevail only when
there was clear evidence that Black jurors who were stricken shared
characteristics in common with White jurors who were empaneled—
necessitating the comparative juror analysis described in Part II.346
Empirical legal research has largely confirmed Justice Marshall’s prediction
that the Batson doctrine would do little, as a procedural matter, to nullify the
prejudicial potential of peremptory challenges.347 Yet ethnographic research
alongside federal prosecutors demonstrates that Batson’s impact on legal

339 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146

U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
340 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (prohibiting sex-based
discrimination during jury selection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83, 86 (1986)
(prohibiting race-based discrimination during jury selection).
341 See, e.g., Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 336, at 1102; Rose, supra note 333, at 699;
Wright et al., supra note 3, at 1425–29.
342 See, e.g., Pollitt & Warren, supra note 332, at 1959 (showing that in the three decades
after Batson was decided, the North Carolina Supreme Court never found that the challenge
of a minority juror was discriminatory); see also Eric N. Einhorn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky
and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 161, 189–94 (1994) (noting that of 113 cases addressing this issue, federal appellate
courts found race-neutral explanations under Batson sufficient in all but five cases). In
practice, appellate courts usually deferred to trial court judges’ rulings on claims of jury
exclusion. Id. at 189.
343 See Marder, supra note 48, at 1593 (noting the Seventh Circuit’s practice of deferring
to the district court judge in an overwhelming majority of Batson appeals between 1986 and
2005).
344 Gabbidon et al., supra note 26, at 63; see, e.g., United States v. Petras, 879 F.3d 155,
163 (5th Cir. 2018) (referencing United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 572 (5th Cir.
2001)) (“Because the trial judge is better able to consider and evaluate the [shared
characteristics], this is precisely the situation in which we defer to the court’s wellconsidered factual determination.”); see also Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 336, at 1105–06
(describing the ease with which one prosecutor provided a combination of race-neutral
explanations for striking a potential Black juror).
345 Gabbidon et al., supra note 26, at 64.
346 Id. at 66.
347 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–103 (1986) (arguing that the only way to
rid the jury system of race-based discrimination is to abolish the peremptory challenge).
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strategy and ethics is understated in the literature.348 There is also mounting
evidence that the peremptory challenge’s impact on jury demographics is
overstated.349 Though ably critiqued, the Batson framework can, and should, be
reformed to deter race-based exclusion. Already, progress is being made.

B. Directions for Reform
Concern about the impact of attorney bias on voir dire has begun to spur
state-level reform aimed at easing the burden faced by those who raise Batson
challenges. The most significant and decisive step toward strengthening
Batson’s effectiveness as a remedy for exclusion was implemented by the
Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (2018), an
attempted murder, assault, and gun possession prosecution.350 During voir dire
in this case, the state used a peremptory strike to remove the single remaining
Black prospective juror—“Juror 10”—on the grounds that the juror i) felt jury
selection was a waste of time, ii) was familiar with the film “12 Angry Men,”
and iii) indicated that extraneous information entered deliberations while
serving as a juror in the past.351 As part of the third step of the Batson test, the
court held that the trial court was not “clearly erroneous” in finding these
rationales “race-neutral” and therefore not indicative of purposeful
discrimination on the part of the state.352
But the court was dissatisfied. Citing Batson’s documented limitations,353
including those noted in the last section, Jefferson adopted a new rule (General
Rule 37 or GR37) and framework for discerning litigant bias.354 Among the
innovations of GR37 was the substitution of subjective assessments of
purposeful discrimination for consideration of how an “objective observer could
view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge” during
the adjudication of a Batson challenge.355 Moreover, the objective observer
imagined by the rule would be someone trained in the prevalence of “implicit,
348 See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly

Exaggerated: How the Batson Doctrine Enforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics,
78 TEMP. L. REV. 607, 608 (2005).
349 See Craft, supra note 100; see also Frampton, supra note 20, at 788.
350 See generally State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018).
351 Id. at 471.
352 Id. at 472.
353 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131 (Wash. 2017); State v.
Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334–36 (Wash. 2013) (subsequent history omitted).
354 Jefferson, 429 P.3d at 479. GR37 was the product of the collaborative labor of a
Workgroup convened by the Supreme Court of Washington, drawing on input from the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Washington Association of the Prosecuting
Attorney (WAPA). See PROPOSED NEW GR 37 JURY SELECTION WORKGROUP, FINAL
REPORT (Feb. 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%
20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-1221Workgroup.pdf [https://perma.cc/29CU-FYUN] [hereinafter
WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT].
355 WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(e) (emphasis added).
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unconscious, and institutional” bias, able to look beneath the surface of
apparently neutral strike rationales.356
Though GR37 did not apply to Jefferson’s prosecution, it came into effect
during the case’s appeal.357 Applying the rule’s new and objective evaluative
criteria for detecting illegal discrimination, the Supreme Court held that an
observer could find that the “neutral” reasons advanced for Juror 10’s removal
raised an “inference of explicit bias.”358 Following Jefferson, GR37 was applied
in a Washington State case in which a juror alleged that she was taunted by
fellow jurors during deliberations for being the sole hold-out in a homicide
prosecution on account of her race.359 In asserting that the trial court failed to
conduct an appropriate inquiry into the juror’s allegations of “differential
treatment,” the Court reasoned that the nature of implicit bias was such that
plausible “neutral” explanations could always be offered, demanding the more
searching inquiry that would come from an evidentiary hearing before deciding
whether to grant the defendant’s motion for a new trial.360 Building on GR37’s
expansion of judges’ evidentiary resources for ruling on Batson challenges,
courts in California,361 Oregon,362 and Connecticut363 may follow suit in their
own assessments of the doctrine.
Another significant contribution of GR37 is its delineation of characteristics
and dispositions that prosecutors are prohibited from referencing as grounds for
strikes due to their historical association with racial exclusion.364 This includes, for
example, prospective jurors’ impressions of—or past contact with—law
enforcement officers.365 Recognizing the empirical reality of Black citizens’
disparate treatment by the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts took the similarly novel step of ruling that even in the cause
356 Id. at 37(f) (“For purposes of this rule, an objective observer is aware that implicit,
institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted
in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.”).
357 State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 478 (Wash. 2018).
358 Id. at 480 (noting that the reasons advanced for striking Juror 10 “lack[ed] support in
the record” and “reflect[ed] differential treatment of the sole African-American juror, and
hence, they ‘could’ support an inference of implicit bias”).
359 State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172, 1176, 1178 (Wash. 2019) (vacating the trial court’s
order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and remanding, because the trial court failed
to adequately conduct and oversee an inquiry into the allegation that racial bias was a factor
in the jury’s verdict).
360 Id. at 1182 (“When determining whether there has been a prima facie showing of
implicit racial basis, courts cannot base their decisions on whether there are equally
plausible, race-neutral explanations. There will almost always be equally plausible, raceneutral explanations because that is precisely how implicit racial bias operates.”).
361 See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 306–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
(Humes, P.J., concurring).
362 See, e.g., State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7, 10, 14 (Or. Ct. App. 2019), adhered to on
reconsideration 302 Or. App. 640 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
363 See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407, 430 (Conn. 2019).
364 See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(h).
365 See id.
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challenge phase of jury selection proceedings, a judge cannot expect jurors to
abandon attitudes toward law enforcement officers born of their life experience.366
Courts that have adopted GR37 have emphasized the personal and
professional difficulty faced by the lawyer accused of purposeful (and illegal)
discrimination.367 The adoption of a “could view” standard, in contrast, “softens
the accusatory edge of the objection” by permitting a judge to deny a party’s
peremptory challenge without suggesting that illegal racial considerations
motivated the offending strike.368
The rule also encourages parties to object to suspect peremptory strikes—
and thus deliberate about the circumstances of an otherwise eligible juror’s
dismissal—before the stricken juror is definitively excused from service.369
This recognition of social discrimination as a dynamic and, indeed, reversible
practice in the context of jury selection empowers judges to not only deter juror
exclusion through post-hoc rulings for which there may be limited remedies,370
but to rectify injustice in real time.
366 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 116 N.E.3d 609, 617 (Mass. 2019) (“[A]

prospective juror may not be excused for cause merely because he or she believes that
African-American males receive disparate treatment in the criminal justice system.”).
367 See WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT, supra note 354, at app. 2 (arguing that to endorse a
“purposeful discrimination” standard such as that advanced by Batson is tantamount to
“compel[ling] a judge to endorse ‘an accusation of deceit or racism’ in order to sustain a
challenge to a peremptory strike”) (quoting State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 338 (Wash.
2013)).
368 Id.
369 Id. at 4.
370 See State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1166–69 (N.J. 1986) (in which the Supreme
Court of New Jersey offered a single, bright-line remedy for juror exclusion that entailed
dismissing all remaining jurors in the venire and summoning a new group so that the jury
selection process could begin again). This approach was criticized and modified in New
Jersey by State v. Andrews, 78 A.3d 971, 978–79 (N.J. 2013), which provided a series of
available Batson remedies. In addition to allowing the parties to restart the jury selection
process, judges could allow an offending party to forfeit one or more peremptory challenges,
grant the offended party additional peremptory challenges, or return wrongfully excused
citizens to the jury box. Id. at 980–84. Finding this more flexible approach to remediating
Batson violations compelling, some state and district courts have begun following suit in the
interest of offering judges freedom and discretion to address jury exclusion in the context of
particular proceedings. See, e.g., Moore v. Schweitzer, No. 3:17-CV-22, 2017 WL 386832,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2017) (concluding that “a bright line, while perhaps helpful to trial
courts, is not appropriate under Batson and its progeny”) (subsequent history omitted); State
v. Urrea, 421 P.3d 153, 156 (Ariz. 2018) (“From Batson’s language we derive three
inferences. First, in declining to express which option was ‘more appropriate,’ the Court
implied that either was ‘appropriate.’ Second, the appropriate remedy may depend on the
circumstances of a ‘particular case.’ Finally, the restoration option contemplates that the
wrongfully excluded jurors will be ‘reinstated on the venire.’”) (citations omitted); State v.
Moore, 30 N.E.3d 988, 996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that “it was within the trial
court’s discretion to determine, based on the circumstances before it, whether the peremptory
challenge that was invalidated under Batson was forfeited or, alternatively, the State could
re-exercise the challenge, provided that it does not exercise it in a discriminatory fashion”).
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In light of the findings presented in Part III of this article, GR37 is likely to
impact prosecutors’ behavior and decision-making during jury selection in
unpredictable ways.371 Prosecutors concerned primarily with the stigma
associated with an adjudicated violation, for example, will be faced with a new
tension. On the one hand, GR37’s prohibition of certain stereotypes of racist
origin may lead to a greater number of Batson challenges surviving the doctrine’s
“third step”; rationales once understood as “neutral” or plausibly innocuous, as
in the Jefferson case, may be deemed racist under the new rule.372 Prosecutors
who view the rarity of successful Batson challenges as reason to question their
relevance may alter their behavior if an effect of GR37 is to make challenges
more prevalent and easily won. This development could amplify Batson’s
deterrent potential by bringing the stakes of violations into view.
The rule’s reference to “implicit, institutional, and unconscious”373 bias
may nevertheless undercut Batson’s deterrent effect on those lawyers primarily
concerned with the professional and reputational harm of a challenge.374 To the
extent that conceptions of bias as “implicit” or “unconscious” absolve
individuals of feeling responsible for the disparate effects of their conduct,375
the doctrine’s tone of moral condemnation may be blunted. This could diminish
the likelihood that a lawyer thinks about her strike decisions in racialized or
gendered terms with the aim of empaneling representative juries.
As inquiries into prosecutors’ actual or apparent motivations for striking
jurors continue to face scrutiny along comparative lines, Batson adjudication
may bring another welcome, if unintended, consequence. To an increasing
extent, judges will need to be watchful of their own rationales for excusing
jurors during the “cause challenge” phase of jury selection proceedings. Insofar
as troubling experiences with law enforcement index race, for example, they
will no longer offer an irreproachable basis for a juror’s dismissal. The result
will be more juries composed of individuals whose life experiences reflect that
of a broader and more diverse public.
Overall, for a rule such as GR37 to chart a path forward for Batson, it must
be tethered to the empirical reality of prosecutorial decision-making and
practice. Effective antidiscrimination law governing the jury system does not
necessitate the erasure of race from jury selection376—and in fact, striving to
371 See Annie Sloan, “What to Do about Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address

Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 255 (2020).
372 Id. at 254, 259.
373 WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(f).
374 Sloan, supra note 371, at 236, 259.
375 Tryon P. Woods, The Implicit Bias of Implicit Bias Theory, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 631,
641–42 (2018) (critiquing implicit bias theory as rooted in the notion that racist ideation is
the product of an erroneous cognitive process for which White people can be absolved, rather
than “situated in the historically entrenched hierarchy of racial regime”).
376 Among the “best practices” suggested, but ultimately not endorsed by the GR37
Workgroup, were measures that sought to prevent attorneys from learning or inquiring about
a prospective juror’s race. See WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT, supra note 356, at app. 2.
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achieve this erasure in practice risks privileging superficial changes over muchneeded structural transformation.377
Building on advances already reflected in the adoption of GR37, it is
instructive to consider novel reforms that will propel the Batson doctrine
forward. The previously described link between prosecutors’ perceptions of the
Batson challenge and their race-conscious effort to empanel inclusive juries
suggests several reforms that might strengthen and enhance the current
framework’s deterrent impact and potential.
First, building on GR37, courts should emphasize that various non-racial
experiences and characteristics nevertheless function as proxies for race and
may constitute illegitimate grounds for striking and dismissing potential jurors.
One example, previously mentioned, is past contact with—and negative
impressions of—the criminal justice system.378 Though some lawyers would
contend that these experiences inhibit a juror’s ability to assess evidence fairly,
a growing scholarly consensus asserts that making this a legitimate basis for
disqualifying or striking jurors will result in discriminatory empanelment.379 By
highlighting this link, courts can push prosecutors to avoid integrating such
information into their decision-making and strategy during jury selection. This
is a reform that should extend to both cause and peremptory challenges of jurors
and prohibit automatic excusal. Further, it should cover, among other things,
prospective jurors with past arrests380 or criminal convictions381 in the absence
of meaningful judge-led voir dire on these subjects. Prosecutors should know
that striking for certain ostensibly “race-neutral” reasons might nevertheless
constitute race-based exclusion.
Second, the prevalence of race-conscious jury selection suggests that an
objective standard should govern judges’ assessments of the motivations behind
for cause excusal and peremptory strikes. The adoption of such a standard would
relieve judges of having to impute racial animus to lawyers based on their personal
understanding of what constitutes an illegitimate juror strike. In so doing, an
objective standard would likely de-personalize the adjudicative process and
encourage judges, who might otherwise feel uneasy about relying on their own
377 See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378
(1988) (“Yet the attainment of formal equality is not the end of the story. Racial hierarchy
cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality in the laws that structure the economic,
political, and social lives of Black people.”).
378 See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(h).
379 See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal
Convictions, 98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 602 (2013).
380 See Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest
Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 389 (2016) (noting that “[a]
significantly higher percentage of people of color have arrest records due to the
disproportionate number of stops, searches, and arrests of people of color”).
381 See Roberts, supra note 379, at 634 (proposing the abandonment of “automatic
exclusions based solely on a potential juror’s criminal record” in the absence of evidence of
bias).
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intuitions, to find Batson violations. This development would force lawyers to
orient their race-consciousness not toward their own or judges’ idiosyncratic
applications of Batson but toward an objective legal standard.
Third, and finally, my empirical findings reinforce the importance of
instructing prospective jurors that they have a constitutional right to participate
as jurors free from racial—or other forms—of exclusion. In addition to
reiterating Batson’s normative vision of the value of representative juries for
defendants and lay citizens alike, an instruction would put prosecutors on notice
that their questioning strategies and stated reasons for strikes might face the
scrutiny of an informed public, as well as of their adversaries or presiding judge.
By creating more-informed jurors, we can expand the capacity of ordinary
people to play an active part in safeguarding the norms of fairness and equality
that should animate our criminal legal system.

V. CONCLUSION
From its inception, the United States’ justice system has had to contend with
deleterious forms of discrimination that inhibit meaningful progress toward the
realization of its constitutional principles. One such principle is a criminal
defendant’s right to an impartial jury of her peers.382 The Batson line of cases has
established a framework that attempts to remedy the longstanding problem of
race-based exclusion. But its effects, at least on the demographic make-up of
juries, is mixed. Having failed to displace race-based exclusion entirely, it is fair
to question what its impact and import are for contemporary legal practice.
This Article, drawing on data from an extensive field study, suggests the need
for a shift in perspective from outcomes to processes, from juries to jury selection,
from quantitative indicators to decision-making and strategy. Doing so sheds new
empirical light on the complex interplay between antidiscrimination doctrine and
legal practice. There has been a clear doctrinal shift in courts’ analyses of juror
questioning and striking, expanding the scope of judicial inquiry during the
adjudication of Batson challenges from scrutiny of individual “neutral” rationales
for juror dismissals to a more robust form of comparative juror assessment.383 My
empirical findings indicate that there is a meaningful connection between this
latter approach and a host of race-conscious prosecutorial behaviors during voir
dire. With this link in mind, it becomes possible to perform a deeper audit of the
Batson doctrine and develop reforms that would advance the critical process of
narrowing the gap between juries as they are and juries as the Constitution would
have them be.

382 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
383 See generally State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407 (Conn. 2019); People v. Bryant, 253

Cal. Rptr. 3d 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).

